
1st BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT



"RED WARRIORS"

BATTLE REPORT

12 - 16 February 1967

v.5 Compiled and Edited by Roger A. Hill January 25, 2008

The Battle at LZ 501N

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division "Red Warriors"

LZ 501N (YA 603547), Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam Operation Sam Houston

11-18 February 1967

v.5 Compiled and Edited by Roger A. Hill January 25, 2008

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

Even though this document has not been "professionally" published, all copyright laws are invoked and should be considered to be in effect. Persons desiring to reproduce or duplicate any part or portion of this document for any reason, shall first secure the editor's permission in writing.


Roger A. Hill

P.O. Box 210 210 East Lena Street Lena, IL 61048-0210

815-369-2330

thearmyspast@mchsi.com

DEDICATION



Left to right: 1SG Francisco Pereda, CPT Ed Northrop Republic of Vietnam - 1967

This book is dedicated to the memory of First Sergeant Francisco Pereda, C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, July 1966 through June 1967. He was a true professional soldier whose guidance and leadership during many combat situations was invaluable. The officers and men of "Chargin' Charlie" are forever indebted to him.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editor's Note	ii
Heroes Carved in Stone by Sabrina Stidham	iii
Red Warrior Task Force	iv
Red Warrior Lineage	٧
Red Warrior Vietnam Mission Statement	vii
Foreword	viii
Part I - Background	1
Part II - The Long Walk	4
Part III - The Battle	15
Part IV - The Aftermath	41
Part V - Appendices	
Appendix A - Red Warrior Chain of Command	A1
Appendix B - Military Occupational Speciality Codes	В1
Appendix C - Red Warrior Personnel Rosters	C1
Appendix D - Red Warrior Casualty Records	D1
Appendix E - Awards	E1
Appendix F - Glossary	F1
Appendix G - Index	G1
Appendix H - Bibliography	H1

EDITOR'S NOTE

To the members of the battalion, please think of this report of the Battle at LZ 501N as the "tip of the iceberg." As you read through it, I'm sure you will see some things in a slightly different perspective than what I have presented from the sources I have been able to locate, some 40 years after the fact. Many events and details have yet to surface; thus they await discovery and recording.

The purpose of this document is to create a chronological sequence of events from the 10th through the 14th of February 1967 leading up to the battle, the 15th and 16th of February 1967 when the battle took place, and the two days after the battle, the 17th and 18th. This report is the result of determining that many of the former members of the units involved have memories of this particular battle, but have no idea when, where, or with whom they occurred. It is hoped that with time and additional input, a clear, concise, moment-by-moment picture will be reconstructed that will help participants to be able to put their memories in order.

This report represents a compilation of information from many sources. It is a "best-effort" to reconstruct the sequence of events of the battle. Because of gaps in the available information, some moments are not as thoroughly depicted or represented as others. It is hoped that with time and the addition of other sources, these gaps will be filled and the record fully reconstructed.

If you were there for any part of this report, and if after reading it you can add or correct anything, please do so. You created this history; please help me record it. No contribution, no memory, is too small or too large, and all are welcome. Thank you.

Contact information:

Roger Hill P.O. Box 210 Lena, IL 61048-0210

thearmyspast@mchsi.com

815-369-2330

"Heroes Carved in Stone" by Sabrina Stidham

I stood staring in awe as my gaze settled upon a black granite wall of memories. As I stood there not a muscle in my body twitched, except for the rhythmic beating of my weary heart.

Before me, a great wall, with the names of Fathers, Sons, Mothers, Daughters; Soldiers; Heroes...carved in stone. As I looked at the granite, I saw behind it a scene of tangled jungles, mud-covered boots, people crying, as their lives came to an unwritten end. On the ground I saw the bodies of fallen soldiers, bloody and cold from death. In my heart I felt their pain and fear, which lingered in their unforgotten souls.

In my mind I could see them standing around me, in what was left of their tiger-striped tattered camouflage. Blood covered, dirty calluses had formed on their hands, and memories of home were lost in the emptiness of their stares.

I saw beside me the American flag, still and unmoving in the bustling air. I shivered at the eerie sight. Suddenly, I felt that I wasn't alone, as though I were in the presence of a soldier; I paused, not believing in my feelings. A chill went down my spine as I felt a touch on my shoulder. I turned to see a woman; a mother, with tears in her eyes, reading the name of her son. At that moment I realized that the soldiers have not been forgotten. They live on in our hearts; then, now, and forever.

As I turned to leave, I hesitated; looked back at the wall and said aloud, "Thank You," and I swear I heard a voice carried on the wind whisper..."Never Forget."

Photograph from WWW.Vietvet.Org

RED WARRIOR TASK FORCE

July 1966 through November 1970



1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Company Alpha Company Bravo Company Charlie Company Delta Company Echo Company



4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery

Bravo Battery



4th Engineer Battalion

1st Platoon, Bravo Company





1st BATTALION, 12th INFANTRY (Red Warriors)



Coat of Arms

Shield:

Azure, in fess two crosses moline argent, in base a wigwam of the like garnished with five poles of the last; on a chief embattled or a sea lion of the third holding in dexter paw a sword of the field.

Crest:

On a wreath of the colors an armored arm embowed proper, grasping in the naked hand a broken flag staff gules, to which is attached a pennant or.

Motto:

Ducti Amore Patriae (Having Been Led by Love of Country).

Symbolism:

The field is blue for infantry. This regiment took part in the Civil War; its great achievement was its first engagement at Gaines' Mill, Virginia, on 27 and 28 June 1862, where its losses were almost 50percent. This is shown by the moline crosses which represent the iron fastenings of a millstone and recall the crushing losses sustained. The wigwam stands for the Indian campaigns in which the regiment took part. The chief is for the War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection, yellow and red being the Spanish colors, red and blue the Katipunan colors; the embattled partition line is for the capture of the blockhouse at El Caney, Cuba, and the sea lion is from the arms of the Philippine Islands. The crest in the Spanish colors commemorates the capture of a Spanish flag at El Caney.

Lineage

Constituted 3 May 1861 in the Regular Army as Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Organized 20 October 1861 at Fort Hamilton, New York. Reorganized and redesignated 7 December 1866 as Company A, 12th Infantry. (12th Infantry assigned 17 December 1917 to the 8th Division; relieved 15 August 1927 from assignment to the 8th Division and assigned to the 4th Division; relieved 1 October 1933 from assignment to the 4th Division and assigned to the 8th Division; relieved 10 October 1941 from assignment to the 8th Division and assigned to the 4th Division [later redesignated as the 4th Infantry Division].) Inactivated 15 July 1947 at Fort Ord, California. Reorganized and redesignated 1 April 1957 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battle Group, 12th Infantry and remained assigned to the 4th Infantry Division (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated). Reorganized and redesignated 1 October 1963 as the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry.

Campaign Participation Credit

Civil War

*Peninsula

*Manassas

*Antietam

*Fredericksburg

*Chancellorsville

*Gettysburg

*Wilderness

*Spotsylvania

*Cold Harbor

*Petersburg

Virginia 1862

*Virginia 1863

Indian Wars

Modocs

Bannocks

*Pine Ridge

War With Spain

*Santiago

Philippine Insurrection

*Malolos

*Tarlac

*Luzon 1899

World War II

*Normandy (with arrowhead)

*Northern France

*Rhineland

*Ardennes-Alsace

*Central Europe

Vietnam

*Counteroffensive, Phase II

*Counteroffensive, Phase III

*Tet Counteroffensive

Counteroffensive IV

Counteroffensive V

Counteroffensive VI

Summer-Fall 1969

Winter-Spring 1970

Sanctuary Counteroffensive

Counteroffensive VII

Decorations

*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered LUXEMBOURG (12 Infantry cited: WD GO 54, 1945)

*Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered PLEIKU PROVINCE (1st Battalion, 12th Infantry cited: DA GO 17, 1968)

*Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered CENTRAL HIGHLANDS (1st Battalion, 12th Infantry cited; DA GO 43, 1970)

*Belgian Fourragere 1940 (12th Infantry cited; DA GO 43, 1950)


*Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in BELGIUM (12th Infantry cited; DA GO 43, 1950)

*Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the ARDENNES (12th Infantry cited; DA GO 43, 1950)

*Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966-1969 (1st Battalion, 12th Infantry cited; DA GO 3, 1970)

*Vietnamese Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966-1969 (1st Battalion, 12th Infantry cited; DA GO 53, 1970)

Company B and Company C each additionally entitled to: Valorous Unit Award,
Streamer embroidered KONTUM (Company B and Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th
Infantry cited: DA GO 43, 1970)



1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT "RED WARRIORS" VIETNAM MISSION STATEMENT

"To close with the enemy
by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him,
or to repel his assault by fire,
close combat and counterattack."

Phu Bai Qui Nhon Nhà, Frang
Cam Ranh Bay Saigon vii

FOREWORD

As with all major traumatic events in a person's life, every man who was present on the morning of February 15, 1967, in Landing Zone (LZ) 501N in the Republic of South Vietnam can tell you exactly what he was doing when the first shots rang out, and exactly how he reacted. Things like this are forever seared into a man's mind. For the men of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, their day of reckoning had begun.

Little did each man know what the next minutes and hours were going to bring. While some men were fighting for (and losing) their lives, others were wondering what was happening. Each fighting position around the LZ perimeter was a world unto itself, yet collectively they represented the sum of the whole. In those first minutes of battle, the soldiers of Charlie Company had no idea they were being attacked by a North Vietnamese infantry battalion whose mission it was to kill everyone in the company.

From the moment the battle at LZ 501N begun, Charlie Company, led by Captain Edward Northrop, acquitted itself on the field of battle with honor and distinction. Engaging the enemy forces at point-blank range with a combination of direct and indirect fire and air support, the men of "Chargin' Charlie" repulsed a determined enemy force almost four times their strength.

When the call went out for assistance, Captain Edward Scherer and his Bravo Company were the next battalion elements to enter the fray. Forced by circumstances, Bravo Company, through air assault, committed its elements by platoon. By the time Captain Scherer was able to get his entire company on the ground in the LZ, his lead platoon was outside the perimeter decisively engaged with the enemy, and in desperate need of help. Utilizing all their resources, Bravo Company executed a movement to contact just before it got dark, linked up with their estranged platoon, and began procedures to break contact with the enemy and return to the safety of the LZ.

In the meantime, having just arrived at the LZ, Alpha Company was sent out immediately to provide a covering screen for Bravo Company and to assist them in getting back inside the perimeter under the cover of darkness. The remainder of the night was punctuated by random and violent bursts of mortar and artillery fire, and air support with illumination.

Sustaining 13 killed (one of whom was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor) and 32 wounded, the Red Warriors and their supporting air and artillery proved their determination and skill as an effective combined arms team. The individual spontaneous and unselfish acts of bravery and extraordinary heroism demonstrated by the men and officers of the battalion on the 15th of February 1967 signify the true character and spirit of the unit known as "The Red Warriors."

PART I BACKGROUND

Part I: Background

INTRODUCTION

[Editor's note: In the course of writing this report, it was brought to my attention that even though many people refer to this battle as the "Battle for 501 North," often the official transcripts identify the LZ as "LZ 501N." It is not clear why the designation of "North" has been used when referring to this battle, but for the sake of historical accuracy, I have chosen to follow the example of the official records and use the designation of "501N."]

This battle report begins as a story about C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, more commonly known as "Charlie Company," AKA "Chargin' Charlie," and the men who comprised the company. But as the battle developed, as all battles do, Alpha, Bravo, and Headquarters Companies were brought into the fray so as to try to even the odds and to insure the outcome.

The foundation of the storyline comes from 1/12 Infantry's After Action Report for this battle, and 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division's Daily Staff Journal log entries for the dates of the battle. The individual accounts come from a series of interviews that were provided some 40 years after the battle by former members of the companies involved. The story chronicles the battalion's efforts during a particularly intense battle in Kontum Province in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in February 1967.

Prior to describing the battle with the 8th Battalion, 66th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment on 15 February 1967, in Kontum Province along the Cambodian border, it is appropriate to review the terrain, weather and astronomical conditions, the enemy situation information available to the battalion, and certain background data concerning the overall scheme of operation and maneuver of Charlie Company and the battalion that led up to the battle known as "501N."

TACTICAL TERRAIN

Some of the terrain between Fire Support Base (FSB) 10B and LZ 501N, over which Charlie Company moved between 12 and 14 February, was very rugged. It was marked by numerous low hills that ranged in height from 200 to 750 meters and were covered by forests with high canopies. Other topographical features included dense undergrowth, tall stands of bamboo, and numerous rivers and streams with marshy areas. Many of these streams were of the intermittent type, and thus were trafficable by troops on foot. All of this made land navigation very difficult.

Suitable LZs along Charlie Company's route of advance through this region were few and far between. When one was found, it was usually only after some improvement that even a single helicopter could use it.

The northern third of this area was slightly more open; thus ground navigation was a little easier. The undergrowth wasn't as dense, there were fewer hills, and no rivers. As Charlie Company advanced to the northwest, they paralleled the Cambodian border to the west,

while Route 615, which was nothing more than an overgrown trail, meandered north-south along their eastern flank.

CLIMATE and ASTRONOMICAL CONDITIONS


Typical for this region during mid-February, the Central Highlands area was about mid-point in its seasonal winter dry period. Temperatures could drop to the low-60's during the night and rise into the high-80's during the day with high humidity. During the period of the battle, "early morning nautical twilight" (EMNT) occurred at 0552, with sunrise at 0614. Sunset was at 1801 with "before evening nautical twilight" (BENT) occurring at 1823. As the moon was "already up" during this period each day at sunset in a less-than-quarter phase, moonset occurred between 2000 and 2400, leaving the remainder of the night to be illuminated only by starlight.

ENEMY SITUATION

According to 4th Division intelligence summaries, the primary enemy threat in the II Corps area came from the NVA command known as the B3 Front. The command was located just across the Cambodian border east of Plei Djereng, and had established several base areas of operation along the border, including Base Area 702. (Base areas were strongholds and sanctuaries used for the staging, training, and resupply of NVA units operating in South Vietnam.) Base Area 702 had been specifically designated to support operations in the Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, the Plei Djereng region, and the Plei Trap area.

Electronic intelligence monitoring of the B3 Front by the 4th Infantry Division had revealed that elements of the 1st NVA Division were operating adjacent to the battalion's area of operation (AO) out of a Cambodian sanctuary identified as Base Area 702. Specific known commands within the 1st Division included the 32nd and 33rd Regiments. Other regiments identified operating out of Base Area 702 at that time were the 66th, 88th, and 101C Regiments. Knowing that a typical NVA regiment had three infantry battalions, and each battalion had four companies, the Red Warriors faced a formidable and dangerous opponent.

A typical NVA infantry battalion.



Flow chart by Ken Conboy, The NVA and Viet Cong.

FRIENDLY SITUATION

At the beginning of 1967, the 4th Infantry Division was based at and working out of Camp Enari, Pleiku. Its 2nd Brigade had established a forward headquarters and supply base at a location known as "3T," YA 855455, which was co-located at the Plei Djereng Airfield. On the 1st of January, 2nd Brigade initiated Operation Sam Houston under Operation Order 1-67. The battalion was a part of 2nd Brigade's Task Force 2-4 under this order.

During the month of January, the battalion, which was nearly at full strength after having just completed a stand-down and refitting, was tasked to perform a security mission for the 2nd Brigade. To that end, Bravo Company was given the mission of providing perimeter security at the 2nd Brigade's forward headquarters at "3T" (GIs called it Three Tango), while the Recon Platoon conducted road clearing operations and convoy security to a forward 16th Artillery FSB on the eastern bank of the Se San River at YA 754502. The remainder of the battalion established an FSB at YA 765493 next to Route 613 and conducted search-and-destroy operations to the south and west of the battalion's base.

On the 1st of February the battalion was released from its brigade security mission. Bravo Company and the Recon Platoon rejoined the battalion at its FSB and prepared for a battalion change of mission. On the 2nd of February, Alpha Company departed the battalion location, moved south overland for 16 kilometers, and secured LZ 10B. The remainder of the battalion task force, minus the Recon Platoon, followed by air on the 9th of February. With the arrival of the battalion's supporting artillery (Bravo Battery, 4/42) at the LZ, 10B became a fire support base.

On the 10th of February, in response to an NVA buildup west of the Nam Satnay River, the 2nd Brigade assigned the battalion the mission of returning to a previously-worked AO, establishing an FSB, and conducting company-sized search-and-destroy operations. Charlie Company, who would have to move overland on foot, was selected to be the initial company to re-enter the AO, and was given a tentative location of YA 602540 for a destination and the proposed FSB. The FSB was given the designation of "501N."

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

In response to a directive received from 2nd Brigade, a battalion operation was developed to search an area west of the Nam Satnay River for the purpose of determining the enemy's activity and intent in this locale. This search area was to be the battalion's new AO. Typically in this region, a battalion AO measured 30 kilometers from north-to-south, and using the Cambodian border as its western boundary, had a depth of no more than 10 kilometers. (Boundaries were always based on the firing fans of the supporting artillery.)

The operations order for Charlie Company's movement had them passing through 2/8 Infantry's AO; thus the company was placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the 2/8. This control status would remain in effect until the 1/12 Infantry was able to assume command and control of Charlie Company and the situation on the ground, on or about the 15th of February. Charlie Company was to begin their overland movement on the 12th of February, which, straight-line, would take them a distance of 27 kilometers.

PART II THE LONG WALK

Part II: The Long Walk

On 10 February the NVA buildup west of the Nam Satnay River became a reality, and the battalion was tasked to establish an FSB (LZ 501N) at YA 602540.

11 February (Saturday)

CPT Ed Northrop, the Charlie Company commanding officer, recalls the initial notification of the pending operation, and the activities of the days leading up to the events of February 15th, 1967.

CPT Northrop: "Charlie Company was providing perimeter security at LZ/FSB 10B when we were notified of a change of mission. Once battalion had the operations order worked out, I was briefed. Normally this event would have included the battalion commander, but because the battalion was preparing to change commanders, I received my orders from the S-3. I was given a verbal OPORD with maps, a proposed route, and a proposed LZ location, which was to be known as '501N.' Our mission was to 'establish this new LZ into which the remainder of the battalion could be inserted, and from which they could then move out into the new AO and conduct operations.' I returned to the company area and gave my platoon leaders the standard information briefing: time, place, and mission. Because we were passing through the 2/8 Infantry Battalion's area, we were to be attached to them for support.

"For this operation, I had Lieutenant (LT) Dave Dresia as my executive officer, LT Bill Crews as the 1st Platoon leader, LT Everett Glick as the 2nd Platoon leader, LT Ben Bulgarin as the 3nd Platoon leader, and LT Timothy Swan as the Weapons Platoon leader. Our artillery forward observer was LT Barry Smith, and my First Sergeant (1SG) was Francisco Pereda. Once the platoon leaders briefed their platoons, the company spent the rest of the day preparing for departure the next morning."

SP4 Lloyd LaValla, an assistant gunner on gun #3 in Charlie Company's weapons platoon, remembers: "The weapons platoon had a slightly different mission than normal during the move to the new LZ. It was during the last stages of the planning on the 11th that a 'command decision' was made that the weapons platoon would leave their guns and ammunition behind and move with the company as another infantry platoon. It had been planned that the guns and ammunition were to be brought in by helicopter with the battalion's supplies when the battalion finally closed into the new LZ. What was not considered was that the LZ could be under heavy enemy fire at the time."

12 February (Sunday)

As was the routine every morning, the day began for Charlie Company with stand-to, recovery of the listening posts (LPs), sweeps, and a quick breakfast with a cup of coffee, a cigarette, and pills. Then they finished packing what hadn't been completed the day before, and stood by to SP.

One person who has some very clear memories about packing up and departing the FSB

is SP4 Dennis Witt, one of the company radio operators (RTO). Dennis recalls: "As I was the commander's battalion RTO, the first thing that was added to my rucksack frame was the PRC-25 radio, which came with its two antennas and bases, handset, speaker, and an extra battery. I had a bedroll attached to the frame that contained an air mattress, mosquito net, and a poncho liner all rolled up inside a poncho. Attached on the outside of the pack were three canteens, an entrenching tool, and a machete. Inside my pack I kept stationery, pens, a camera and film, toiletries, a towel, a washcloth, extra socks, a few pictures and 'good' letters from home (especially perfumed ones), and a miniature Bible. The smaller items that were susceptible to water damage were kept in a small tin box or waterproof bags. In addition to the rucksack with radio, I wore a pistol belt with suspenders and two ammo pouches to which I attached eight hand grenades, four smoke grenades, a first aid packet, and a pair of work gloves. I carried three days' worth of C-rations, one or two cans of RC soda, heat tabs or C-4, matches, a hunting knife, and a pocket knife. Around my neck I wore my dog tags with a St. Christopher's medal and a P-38. I capped all this off with my steel helmet in which I kept a picture of a 'Playmate of the Month' in the webbing (to whom I would say 'Hello' each time I leaned on my M-16 to rest). I also carried an M-16 rifle and 21 magazines of ammo in an old Claymore mine bag tied to the back of the pack.

"My pack was so heavy that to get it and me off the ground, I'd have to start with the pack leaning against a tree or bunker. Then I'd sit down in front of it with my back to it and slide my arms through the shoulder straps. Next I would twist my body over to a position on all fours, then push myself up into a kneeling position. Using my M-16 as a crutch, I would pull myself up, one leg at a time, to a full upright position on my feet.

"Sitting down and standing up again was such an effort that when we would stop moving for a few minutes, instead of sitting down, I'd curl my toes in one boot, place the barrel of my M-16 on the empty toe of that boot, lean over with the weight of my upper body on the butt plate of my rifle, and brace my hands on my knees. I spent quite a bit of time resting in that position."

CPT Northrop: "We departed the battalion FSB early in the morning for the new area of operation. The terrain was awful. We were constantly going up and downhill, which meant that understanding distances, keeping a pace count, and staying on azimuth were very difficult. The terrain varied from single canopy to triple canopy. The visibility was usually between 50-to-100 feet at most. In the normal march formation, the company was spread out almost 1,000 meters. Command and control was a challenge. The maps were difficult to read, and the scale, 1:100,000, was cumbersome and about two-to-four times worse than what we had worked with previously. Plus, the maps were not very accurate. Trying to determine how big hills were, which hill we were on, and whether there were ravines, streams, or creeks ahead was a constant task.

"I do not remember the exact distance, but it was a long and arduous trip. My best recollection is that it was between 15-to-20 kilometers. I believe this because I also remember being concerned about our lack of artillery support. Artillery was important not only for fire support purposes, but because it could help maintain some reasonable idea of our location. When we were in doubt, I would request a round be fired on a specific

Charlie Company's Long Walk 12-14 February



The blue line represents the axis of advance, but not the exact route, that Charlie Company followed between the 12th and 14th of February. The straight-line distance is 27 kilometers, but when the elevations that were traversed and obstacles bypassed are factored in, the total distance is much greater. The starting point on the southern end is FSB 10B, while the termination point in the north is LZ 510N. Note how close their advance took the company to the Cambodian border and the enemy's base area.

location on the ground or in the air on our flank, then we would use our compasses to plot a back azimuth from the direction of the sound or sight of the explosion.

"Not only was maintaining internal communications difficult, keeping external communications with the 2/8 Infantry was also difficult at times. Depending on the terrain, distance, and our radio's battery strength, we could lose contact. On more than one occasion the 2/8 had to put a helicopter up to serve as a communications relay for us.

"This type of environment represented significant resupply problems. My key concerns were water, ammunition, and food. The water available to us was terrible; it was warm and we went through it fast. One of our standard operating procedures was to refill canteens when we crossed creeks and rivers. The problem was we had no way to confirm how clean the water was, and most likely it was contaminated. We were issued iodine tablets to add to the water. We were supposed to wait five minutes, then shake the canteen with the cap loose so some water could leak out and sanitize the opening. Iodine-treated water tasted pretty much like straining liquid metal through your teeth. When possible, a lot of guys flavored it with 'Kool-Aid' to help kill the foul taste of the iodine.

"We generally received ammunition and food through helicopter resupply. There was no set re-supply routine, but we would usually request more rations about every third day. Each soldier carried several days' worth of C-rations, rice, and two or three canteens of water. When we did need more supplies, we found, more often than not, that the triple canopy would be so thick that the smoke we used to mark our location for the resupply helicopters couldn't penetrate the vegetation. Finding a suitable place for a helicopter to land was not always the easiest thing to do either. Often, they would hover as low as they could, then just drop our supplies out. For this particular operation, we didn't receive any resupply until we arrived at our destination.

"Around 1500, we found a suitable location for a night defensive position and stopped for the day. By dark, we had completed our security measures and were settled in. It turned out to be an uneventful night."

13 February (Monday)

On the 13th of February, in a change of command ceremony at FSB 10B, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) George Wilcox assumed command of the battalion, replacing LTC James R. Lay, who moved to division headquarters.

CPT Northrop: "At first light, I had the company begin breaking down our night position. We emptied our sand bags and packed them for re-use, filled in the bunkers so the NVA couldn't use them later, and policed and buried our trash. As soon as the platoons reported they were ready, a recon patrol was sent out ahead of the main body to make sure the route ahead was clear. When the patrol gave the 'all clear,' I moved the company out, and we continued toward the northwest. After traveling about two-to-three kilometers, I had the artillery FO adjust a few rounds onto the night location in case someone following us had stopped to see if we had left anything or buried something useful.

"Soon after that, the point element broke out of the jungle onto the bank of the Se San River. Getting over this obstacle was going to be a challenge. My major concern was our vulnerability during the crossing. Prior to trying anything, I sent reinforced patrols up and down the river to find the best crossing site. Once that was selected, a couple of men with ropes were dispatched to the far side to attach them and set up security. We were carrying ropes, several per platoon, in anticipation of crossing rivers. After getting a few more men across to beef-up the security, the main body started crossing.

"The river was flowing fairly fast, maybe five-to-eight kilometers per hour. It was about 50-to-75 meters across and somewhere close to eight-to-ten feet deep or more in places. I'm not really sure of the depth, but I know we couldn't walk across. With the single-strand rope, we used the hand-over-hand method to pull ourselves across. This feat was no easy task considering most men were carrying 75-pound packs. We also placed another rope downstream to catch anyone who might slip off. Other than losing some equipment, the crossing went fairly well without incident. Caring for weapons, ammo, and rucksacks was an issue. Everything got wet, but nothing bad came of the crossing."

PFC Thomas Hedin, a member of Charlie Company's 1st Platoon, 2nd Squad, recalls this particular river crossing: "While moving to 501N, the company had to cross a river. For me it was easy, but for some of the guys close to me, it was very difficult. It was the first time we had to use ropes to cross a river. The water was deep and flowing fast. The biggest problem was not getting across the river by rope, but getting our equipment across. We were carrying big packs, ammunition, and weapons, and every third man carried a mortar round. We were used to crossing streams that had bottoms. This was a fast flowing river with a bottom that we couldn't touch. Most of us were in excellent physical condition; those chin-ups in basic training really paid off. As we entered the water, someone was at the water's edge to help you get started and to help the next guy get ready. Afterwards, we talked about it and decided that it wasn't so bad after all, no one had to pick any leeches off, and we'd all had our baths for the day."

CPT Northrop: "While on the move, our ability to spread out was largely dependent on the terrain. I had one platoon on the point, a platoon on each flank, and the weapons platoon bringing up the rear. The command group, which consisted of myself, two RTOs, the artillery FO and his RTO, the 1SG, two medics, and a headquarters section NCO, was a reasonable distance behind the lead element and between the two flank elements. Being on point was not a good deal. While everyone was at risk, the platoon up front was most likely to walk into danger first. Because of the stress, I tried to rotate responsibility for point duty among the three line platoons daily. Different squads were designated to watch specific areas around us as we moved. Someone was always watching the rear, flanks, trees, and looking for booby traps — 'EYES EVERYWHERE!'

"A survival strategy requirement was to know without hesitation the proper actions to take on enemy contact. We practiced various maneuvers constantly. Leaders at all levels asked: What if the enemy attacks here? Who sets up the base of fire? Who maneuvers? Who calls for air support and artillery? In all cases, as a worst-case situation, we established rallying points if people became separated. We also employed a technique of leaving ambush patrols in stay-behind positions, in case the enemy was following us.

"Every time we stopped for any reason, we set up security. If the halt was for a short break or a noon meal, someone was always cleaning his M-16. The one thing I had to be careful of was men falling asleep. They were so tired that many times they would go to sleep in seconds if they sat down. Because of this, after moving a few hundred meters, I would routinely have the company conduct a 'head-count.' This always proved interesting and difficult to get right.

"As on the previous day, around 1500, we found a place to stop and establish our night defensive position. By now our routine was well-established: individual fighting positions around the perimeter by platoon, any resupply that was necessary, an LP out in front of each platoon, DEFCONS adjusted, communications established, and silence as darkness settled over us."

14 February (Tuesday)

CPT Northrop: "At some point in the morning we encountered and crossed our second major river, the Nam Satnay. Luckily it wasn't as deep or wide as the one the day before. I treated it the same though -- reconnaissance and security on both sides. The crossing went much quicker, as we only had to **wade** across the Nam Satnay."

1400 (DSJ) SITREP C/1/12 closed and secured LZ 501N at YA603540.

CPT Northrop: "Typically I would try to stop for the day sometime between 1400 and 1600 to allow the company sufficient time to prepare their night defensive positions. On this day we arrived around 1400 at the proposed LZ site we'd been directed to occupy in the vicinity of YA 602540. While the company went about its business of starting to set up the LZ, 1SG Francisco Pereda and I looked the site over carefully. Discussing what we saw, we agreed that the site was unsuitable due to the terrain and vegetation."

1425 (DSJ) SITREP C/1/12 observed two enemy personnel 350 meters NE of LZ moving north, one individual carrying a weapon.

SP4 Witt: "I seem to have a memory that someone reported seeing a few NVA somewhere on this day. Unfortunately I don't remember any other details about the sighting."

CPT Northrop: "After reporting my concerns about the site to the 2/8 and getting their permission to relocate, I had the company stop what they were doing, saddle up, and prepare to move. We had been there about an hour. The alternate location I chose was about two-and-a-half kilometers further north, which turned out to be an old FSB known as 'Warrior LZ' at YA 603547. This fire base had last been occupied in November 1966, and was now heavily overgrown, but it was still a better choice than the first place.

"Upon our arrival the challenge was to prepare our positions as quickly as possible, as it was much later than normal, close to 1700. As we had only about two hours of daylight left, everyone worked very hard getting their bunkers built using the old bunker materials scattered about, and registering our DEFCONs. I had two planned, one on each of the two

hill masses south of our location, which, by the way, fit our plan as I never fired long or short of our position, only left or right. Because we were out of range of the 4/42, we were receiving support from the 16th Artillery's eight-inch and 155mm guns. The one thing we didn't get done was clearing the fields of fire. By the time the bunkers were revamped, it had just gotten too dark.

"My first bad omen of the day was when the 2/8 Infantry failed to get me my 81mm mortar as they had agreed to. We had left it with them with the understanding they would fly it out to us as soon as we arrived at the LZ. We normally carried one mortar with a bipod and 110 rounds of mixed ammo (90 high explosive, 10 smoke and 10 white phosphorous). Because of the weight of the outer ring of the baseplate, it was used primarily only in the FSBs; it was just too heavy to carry on operations. When we were on an operation, we carried just the inner or smaller plate. This would still provide enough stabilization to fire the gun. (As a result of this incident, we never, ever again went on any operation without the 81mm mortar!)

"As darkness settled over the LZ, the LPs moved into position. Each platoon was required to man one position, normally with three soldiers (one could be asleep at a time – and we hoped it was only one). Each platoon leader selected his own location. The distance out from the perimeter was directly dependent on the terrain and vegetation, but usually 75-to-100 meters. Manning the LPs was a challenge: trying to keep exhausted soldiers awake; maintaining communications with them; and keeping them quiet so as not to give away their locations. On this night, with the LPs in position, silence set in. The long night of waiting and listening began. We heard nothing."

SP4 Witt: "I remember that we arrived at our destination much later in the day than usual. It must have been because we had moved so far that day. Normally CPT Northrop always tried to get us into night positions early enough so that we would have plenty of time to dig in and cut fields of fire before dark.

"Luckily, when the battalion had abandoned this LZ back in November, they just collapsed all the bunkers before we left. As soon as we arrived this time, we immediately set to work rebuilding the bunkers by pulling all the logs and sandbags out of the holes and using the same materials to rebuild the bunkers in their original positions. We had just enough time to rebuild the perimeter and command bunkers before nightfall came. That's why we had such substantial bunkers on the 15th. I shudder to think how things would have turned out had we not been able to do that.

"Unfortunately, there wasn't enough time that evening to build bunkers and also to do a decent job cutting down the thick undergrowth in front of the perimeter; consequently, quite a bit of the tall undergrowth that had grown up since last November was still standing and was within 10-to-15 yards of the front of the bunkers, occupying our previously clear fields of fire around our perimeter. There were also plenty of logs lying around just outside the perimeter, which is why the NVA were able to get within 10-to-20 yards of the bunkers on the 15th. This closeness led to the grenade battles we had.

"Although I had been in the jungle for three months (since November of 1966), oddly, this

location was the very first fire base I had ever seen in the Vietnam. A couple of weeks after I had joined Charlie Company in the jungle the previous November, our turn came to pull 'palace guard.' This was the fire base we went to and guarded. I remember walking out of the jungle back then and seeing the fire base for the first time and thinking to myself, 'This isn't exactly the 'palace' I had pictured in my mind.' Little did I know then what the future had in store for us and this place.

"Thinking about how the perimeter was finally set up, and using north as 12 o'clock, 1st Platoon covered from 11 o'clock to 3 o'clock, 2nd Platoon had from 3 o'clock to 7 o'clock, and 3rd Platoon was assigned from 7 o'clock to 11 o'clock. Weapons platoon was given four bunkers between 1st and 3rd Platoons on the north end.

"A final remembrance for this day: the last helicopter resupply of the day brought in mail instead of our mortars. CPT Northrop was very upset by this. Care packages were good to have on the 14th, but mortars, as it turned out, would have been wonderful to have on the 15th."


PFC Hedin: "After we arrived at 501N and our platoon had been assigned the east-northeast part of the perimeter, Jim Thronson, another guy whose name I can't remember, and I, were given one of the old bunkers to rebuild. We were on the right end of the platoon with one bunker between us and 2nd Platoon. One of the first things we always did was to make sure our fields of fire were correct with the bunkers on either side of us.

"The hole we were given was about four feet deep and wide enough for three guys. The depth was sufficient to allow one guy to get around another if we had to. We placed a log across the front edge of the hole and laid a layer of filled sandbags on top of the log to form the shooting port. We extended the sandbags as a low wall around the rest of the hole, but left an opening in one side for an entrance. There was one step cut into the earthen wall to help us get in and out. We then scrounged logs from other old bunkers that were not being used and used downed trees that were scattered around to build our overhead cover. On top of this we placed a final layer of sandbags. Most of the guys carried three or four empty sandbags tightly rolled up with the rest of their gear. These were used over and over again. When completed, the bunker probably measured around five feet from the bottom of the hole to the top of the roof. We never had a sleeping area inside the bunkers. Instead we would clear the area directly behind the bunker and use that. The only protection we had was what the bunker provided us.

"We only had machetes to cut down trees and clear fields of fire. We would usually look for the easiest trees to cut down to build our overhead cover. This sometimes led to disagreements with other bunker teams as to what 'belonged' to whom. Normally, over time, our bunkers were improved. This probably was the case at 501N; as I recall our bunker was much better than what we usually had."

1745 (DSJ) SITREP C/1/12 observation post spotted approximately 15 enemy soldiers moving in a column formation from the southwest to the northeast at YA 597543 (Hill 346). The OP team got the impression they had observed the tail-end of the column. The enemy

Charlie Company at LZ 501N 14 February



By nightfall, Charlie Company was dug-in at LZ 501N. Lacking their 81mm mortars, the company commander placed the weapons platoon in the perimeter for maximum fire-power. The platoons were arranged in sequence in a counter-clockwise pattern. The company CP was located off-center in anticipation of the arrival of the battalion CP and the supporting artillery the following day. Each platoon was responsible for the emplacement of a listening post outside the perimeter in front of their respective platoon sector. DEFCONs were registered on the two hill masses southwest and southeast of the perimeter.

soldiers observed were not wearing any headgear, but were carrying automatic weapons. Artillery was called for on the location the enemy soldiers were last seen.

1935 (DSJ) SITREP C/1/12 reported freshly-dug fighting positions completely surrounding their location. The enemy positions were approximately 150 meters out from the perimeter. The positions on the west side were the freshest, having been dug either yesterday or today.


SP4 LaValla: "After walking for two-and-a-half days and arriving at the new LZ, we were integrated into the company's perimeter and even had our own LP that first night, something that some of the platoon members didn't like because they had never been trained to do that."

LT Timothy Swan: "I remember sending out an LP well. There was considerable resistance within the weapons platoon to putting an LP out. I had to do some persuading, emphasizing the absolute necessity of staying awake and alert out there."

Just before last light, Charlie Company set out four LPs, one from each of the three line platoons and one from the weapons platoon. The LPs were positioned in front of and about center of their respective platoon's center of sector. The company had seen sufficient evidence of enemy activity around them earlier in the evening to warrant the additional LP from the weapons platoon. Once darkness descended over the LZ, the company settled into its normal cycle of sleep, security, and radio watch, with some men asleep and some awake at each position, rotating throughout the night.

[As Charlie Company would soon find out, throughout the evening and night of February 14th, the NVA's 8th Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment's reconnaissance unit had led its companies into their assault position south of Charlie Company. Out of concern of being prematurely discovered and losing the element of surprise, the NVA battalion commander had forbidden any of his units to dig in for fear they would make noise and reveal their locations. The 7th Company was positioned to the southwest of the perimeter at the base of Hill 346, while the 6th Company went into the southeast at the base of Hill 330 and used a ravine for concealment. The 5th Company was held in reserve and was situated on the reverse or south side of Hill 330. The battalion's weapons platoon set up their 82mm mortars south of Hill 346 on its reverse slope, about 1,000 meters southwest of the LZ. The NVA were scheduled to launch their ground attack at 0700 the next morning under the cover of a supporting mortar attack to be fired by their weapons platoon.]

The Enemy Situation 14-15 February



During the night of 14 February, the NVA 8th Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment moved into their assault positions south of Landing Zone 501N. By 0700 on the 15th, the 7th Company was in position southwest of the LZ; the 6th Company was located to the southeast; and the 5th Company was in reserve approximately 500 meters behind the assault elements. The battalion's weapons platoon was in support about 1,000 meters to the south of the battalion.

PART III THE BATTLE

Part III: The Battle

15 February

0500 - 0635 (ENN/AAR) After a quiet night, Charlie Company initiated stand-to, making sure everyone was up and ready in their fighting positions. Once all platoons reported stand-to complete, select squads were designated and prepared to go out on sweeps in front of their platoon sectors, while everyone else busied themselves with their daily morning rituals of hygiene, pills, and breakfast. At first light, the 3rd Platoon squad was the "first one out the gate." Working in a clock-wise rotation, 1st Platoon was scheduled to go next, and 2nd Platoon was last. The LPs that had gone out the evening before were waiting to be picked up by their respective platoon sweeps and brought back in.

CPT Northrop: "The company began the day with stand-to at 0500. My first order of the day for me was a cup of either hot cocoa or coffee and a cigarette. The first order of the day for each rifle platoon was to conduct a sweep of the area in front of their platoon's portion of the company perimeter, normally 300-to-500 meters out, depending on the terrain. Because the weapons platoon had only about 15 men in it, I didn't task them to send out a patrol.

"The patrols, which were reinforced squads with a machine gun team (about 12 men with a Sergeant (SGT) or Staff Sergeant (SSG) squad leader), were sent out in a staggered manner. Generally speaking, about the time the first patrol was returning, the third would be departing. This would have the second patrol about halfway through their patrol. I do not recall the times, but I never had all three patrols out at the same time for obvious security reasons."


PFC Hedin: "Early in the morning SGT Panak came down the line to our squad's position and told us that Willett's squad would be out in front of us soon, and that we were to be careful selecting targets if we had to fire our weapons."

0700 (DSJ) Suddenly the calm of the early morning was shattered by gun fire. The sweep squad from Charlie Company's 1st Platoon had made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force at YA 608543. The squad was to the east of the perimeter and was currently pinned down with two wounded. Almost simultaneously the 3rd Platoon sweep squad on the southwest side of the perimeter, under the command of SSG Domingo, also made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force.

PFC Hedin: "A short time after SGT Panak had spoken to us, all Hell broke loose with a lot of small arms fire. Time is a blur for me about this. It was not a breakfast, lunch, and dinner kind of day."

LT Swan: "It all started with some small arms shooting in the distance (3rd Platoon's sweep), then a machine gun rattling (Willett?), then seconds later at least half a dozen Claymores blowing. I'll never forget it. I had heated some water over C4 for some C-ration coffee and was just taking my first sip. I never took a second sip. First I stood up to try to

Charlie Company Sweeps at EMNT 15 February



On the morning of February 15th, Charlie Company planned to send three sweeps out to see if the enemy had managed to get close to the perimeter during the night. Sweeps from 1st and 3rd Platoons made enemy contact almost simultaneously. The 1st Platoon sweep to the southeast immediately became pinned down, while the 3rd Platoon sweep to the southwest was able to break contact and withdraw safely back to the perimeter. The Second Platoon sweep never made it out.

see what all the shooting across the way was about, then 'BLAM! BLAM!'; the Claymores were going off and seemingly walking around the perimeter toward us. And then I saw what I'd never expected actually to see: a live NVA soldier in uniform with a pith helmet and an AK-47 rifle moving along the edge of the woodline in front of 2nd Platoon's positions. I dove into my foxhole just as all Hell broke loose. I never saw such a sight again."


SP4 Witt: "The day started out, as most did in the RVN, with us getting up before dawn. Shortly after rising that morning, I decided to make my breakfast. Looking for a good place to sit while making my traditional breakfast of hot chocolate and peanut butter and jelly toast, I casually walked from the command bunker over to a large hole located on the perimeter just past one of 2nd Platoon's bunkers. I sat down with my feet dangling in the hole, and started heating water for my hot chocolate. While it heated, I opened my can of bread, cut my bread in half, and then opened the cans of peanut butter and jelly and mixed them together. When the water was hot enough, I mixed in the chocolate, tasted it, and remarked to myself that this was the best damned hot chocolate I had ever made. I had just put it down when it started.

"Suddenly there was the sound of heavy small arms fire coming from outside the perimeter and down to my left about five or six bunkers from where I was sitting. As I jerked my head in the direction of the shots to the northeast, I jumped up and began running for the command bunker, which was probably about 30 yards away. But as soon as I started to run, very heavy incoming small arms fire began coming from the jungle directly in front of where I had been sitting. I could hear the bullets going by and knew I'd probably never make it to the command bunker, so I dove for cover in back of the 2nd Platoon bunker on the perimeter. I also remember the Claymores being fired. The guys in the bunker I was behind had yelled 'Claymore!' before they fired theirs. Several others followed in succession up and down the line.

"There were four guys already in the bunker, armed with an M-60 and three M-16's -- all were friends of mine from 2nd Platoon. Fire was very intense in both directions for several minutes. I yelled to the guys that I was in the back and passed them some ammunition they needed that was outside the bunker. There I was, with a major battle starting, my first, and I'm not at my post as the CO's RTO, and I'm unarmed -- my M-16 was about 25 yards away, leaning against the side of the command bunker. I'm also not in a bunker -- no room for a fifth guy in this one -- I'm behind it and wondering what's coming next. It wouldn't take long to find out.

"One vivid memory I have is the sound of the voices immediately after the shooting started. The NVA were obviously not quite ready to attack when our sweeps encountered them. Just after I dove behind the bunker, I could hear the jungle filled with voices of what were probably the NVA officers yelling directions to their men. I remember thinking that it sounded like there were a whole lot of them out there. It was very haunting, strange, and surprising to me to hear all the voices mixed in with the sounds of small arms fire. I guess in all my imaginings about what a battle would be like, I never thought about, nor expected to hear, the voices of the enemy in combat."

A View of the Battlefield 15 February



Photograph courtesy Dennis Witt. A view of the battlefield on the morning of the 15th taken looking out of the firing port of a 2nd Platoon bunker during the battle. At one point an NVA soldier had managed to crawl close enough to toss a hand grenade through this firing port and wound all four 2nd platoon men inside the bunker. SP4 Witt, assisted by one of the wounded, manned the bunker for several hours. It wasn't until Alpha Company arrived later in the day that Witt was finally able to return to the company TOC.

CPT Northrop: "We made contact with the enemy at about 0700. From that moment on, things started happening fast, and the chronology of all the reports and sequence of events became a blur. Initially we didn't know that the NVA was a much larger force than we were. What we soon realized was that the 1st Platoon squad, which had only gotten about 100 meters out to the southeast, had encountered a company-sized NVA force moving into its position. This was a 'meeting engagement' — in that neither side planned this to happen. At this point things got a little hairy and stayed that way for the next 48 hours.

"In the initial phase we were able to pull the 3rd Platoon patrol back in quickly, but the 1st Platoon squad was pinned down and unable to break contact. We attempted to provide covering fire to facilitate their withdrawal, but they were too close to the enemy and we couldn't bring the artillery fire in close enough to help. The only way they were finally able to break contact was when PFC Willett, their machine gunner, sacrificed himself by providing covering fire so that the rest of his squad could return to the perimeter."

0715 - **0730** (AAR/DSJ) In a coordinated attack, the enemy dropped mortar rounds onto the LZ from mortar positions to the southwest of the LZ, and launched a sizeable ground assault against the whole southern perimeter of the LZ. In places, the enemy was able to push in as close as hand-grenade distance from the bunkers. Reports of the attack were transmitted to battalion, who passed them on to 2nd Brigade.

SP4 Witt: "The area directly in back of the bunker was the sleeping area. It was surrounded by three heavy logs lying on the ground. Shortly after the battle had begun, I realized how close-in the enemy really was when an NVA grenade came sailing through the air and landed just on the other side of one of the logs. I yelled "Grenade!" and lay down as flat as I could behind the log. The grenade exploded less than two feet from me, but the log did its job and protected me from harm.

"The guys in the bunker then started passing their grenades out to me because I could throw them from behind the bunker. I immediately threw three of them over the top of the bunker toward the direction I thought the NVA grenade had come from. But, because I was behind the bunker and really couldn't see, the direction and distance were just guesses. A couple of minutes after my third grenade exploded, I heard another muffled explosion and then screams from inside the bunker. It took a moment for me to realize what had happened. An NVA had managed to get a grenade inside the bunker in front of me, where it had exploded at the feet of the four soldiers.

"All were wounded and came crawling out of the side entrance of the bunker to where I was in the back. I yelled for a medic and then threw five grenades in a spray pattern in front of the bunker. Someone yelled that there was no one in the bunker, so in I went. I immediately tried to use the M-60, but it was jammed — it didn't work the rest of the day — so I began firing one of the M-16's.

"In the meantime, one of our medics, God bless him, ran under fire to our bunker and began helping the wounded. Three of the guys were evacuated away from the perimeter, but one of the guys, Daniel Marshall, felt that he was still capable of helping, so he came back into the bunker with me. I'm thankful he did; he was a big help. He couldn't stand very well with his leg wounds, so he sat or leaned against the side of the bunker. He loaded magazines for me for several hours. At that time we still didn't have a lot of magazines available, so most of our M-16 ammo was carried in bandoliers in cardboard boxes. It had to be loaded into the limited number of magazines we had as the battle went on. Marshall would load and I'd shoot. About an hour into the battle, a medic brought me my M-16 when he came to check on Marshall again. I didn't know why, but I felt more comfortable when I finally had my personal weapon with me in the bunker.

"Most of the time I was just shooting at movement in the undergrowth -- just quick shots in the direction of the movement -- never really having time to aim and never on full auto. I purposely didn't use full auto because I felt I had to maintain a good volume of fire coming out of the bunker, but still conserve ammo. It was good I did, because by the time I left the bunker, I wasn't counting magazines, I was counting bullets.

"One time though, I clearly spotted an NVA soldier through a small crease in the undergrowth. He was crouched down, but I could see him from his belly to the top of his head. He seemed to be talking to someone to his left. I remember thinking, 'This guy is mine.' I took slow, careful aim at his forehead and squeezed off a round. I couldn't believe it when he didn't fall! He should have been dead with the back of his head blown off! Before I could gather myself and shoot again, he moved to the side and I couldn't see him anymore. I always felt that I probably should have switched to full auto for that shot."

CPT Northrop: "Eventually I was forced to make a difficult decision, in that I found it necessary to bring artillery and air power to bear on the enemy positions, knowing that PFC Willett was still out there, but not knowing if he was dead or alive. Regardless, I made the decision; otherwise the entire company was subject to being over-run. At the time all we knew was that there were a lot of NVA to our immediate south, and that they were placing intense fire on us from three directions using rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and machine gun fire. It wasn't until after the battle that we found out from enemy POWs that we had been confronted by a reinforced infantry battalion, a force three-to-four times larger than ours."

0730 - 0800 - (AAR/ENN) In the next 30 minutes, Charlie Company coordinated much needed air support, got the aircraft on station, and had them ready to place their ordnance on target.

CPT Northrop: "At approximately 0730 I made radio contact with our Air Force FAC. He had been alerted to our enemy contact and had arrived on station. His call sign was Cider 26, and I later learned his name was CPT Gene Fontenout. In the course of a brief conversation with him, I informed him of our situation and asked for his assistance with some air support. One of the first things the FAC, the artillery FO, and I did was to establish firing areas and flight corridors, as we did not want the artillery accidently hitting a plane flying in on a sortie. Within the first few hours of contact, approximately 14 sorties were flown. The effectiveness of these strikes was tremendous. Five-hundred-pound bombs were being dropped within 50-to-100 meters of our perimeter. Because of the closeness of the explosions, I was worried that some of our bunkers might collapse. Every time a sortie came in, the word went out to the company to get under cover in their

bunkers. Napalm was also being dropped very close. I have to admit, when the napalm started coming in, I was very nervous. Those damned things tumble and then sometimes bounce. The reason for using napalm was because even the 500-pound bombs were not effectively eliminating the enemy who were, in many cases, hidden among the fallen trees. Generally speaking, the aircraft flew parallel to our lines when releasing their bombs. I can still feel the bunkers shaking and see all the dust flying with each explosion."

0845 (DSJ) Charlie Company reported that the squad that was pinned down had finally been able to break contact with the enemy and return to the safety of the perimeter.

PFC Hedin: "At some point I remember being told that Willett's squad was coming in and not to fire on them. One of the squad members came in and said that Willett went crazy out there, that he was standing up firing and hollering for his squad to return. Then another guy came into our bunker. He had no helmet, his M-16 was packed with mud, and he was incoherent. Someone came and took him away. I've always wondered who he was and what he is doing today. I found out later that Willett had been killed, and that SP4 James Kramer was also killed when he tried to pull Willett out."


0900 - 0930 (AAR/DSJ) With a lull in the firing, it became apparent that the enemy had withdrawn and that contact had been broken, for the moment, at least. Not knowing how long this respite might last, Charlie Company immediately set to assessing its situation. A quick count revealed that the company had eight wounded and could use some more ammunition. Then without warning, the enemy renewed their attack against the south-southwestern portion of the perimeter.

SP4 Witt: "Later in the morning the shooting started to die down a bit, and our air cover was working hard. I noticed that every time an aircraft would pass over a particular area of the perimeter, a heavy automatic weapon would fire on it. Since I knew that the weapon was located in exactly the same direction from which we had walked in the previous day, I decided to tell CPT Northrop about it. I told Marshall I'd be right back, and ran to the command bunker. When I got there, CPT Northrop asked me where I'd been. I told him I was in a bunker on the perimeter and had to go back, but just needed to tell him about the NVA automatic weapon. I told him the direction, guessed at the distance, and then ran back to the bunker. CPT Northrop relayed the information to a FAC. A few minutes later an aircraft dropped a very BIG bomb exactly where I thought the gun was placed. It must have taken it out, because I didn't hear it shooting again the rest of the day."

CPT Northrop: "On at least three different occasions I asked Cider 26 if he could assist me in determining exact enemy locations. This he did, but only by subjecting himself to intense ground fire. How Cider 26 remained in the air was hard to understand, considering the volume of enemy fire he took. In fact, I thought he was hit several times.

"Cider 26 also assisted in directing artillery fires on the enemy's position. This proved to be of tremendous value, as LT Smith, my artillery FO, had been trying to sneak the artillery in between sorties as close as he could get it without hitting us, and could only guess where to shoot. Coordination between the air and artillery support was critical, as they both were trying to hit the same area. Timing was everything. We would shift the artillery

Placement of Artillery Fire 15 February



Artillery fires were well executed and very effective. Between the FO and FAC, the NVA suffered significant losses with their decision not to dig in. Because of LZ's location, the only artillery support that could be provided came from the 16th Artillery's 155mm and 8 inch guns.

further south to block enemy routes of either withdrawal or reinforcement, then bring in the jets. It sounds complicated, but it worked fine. As results later confirmed, the blocking fires of artillery directed by Cider 26 prevented an enemy company from reinforcing their attack. It is hard to assess the amount of ordnance delivered, but it was a lot. I was also told after the battle that the artillery supporting us had fired so many rounds that they had to rotate their guns because they wore out their tubes."

0900 - 1115 (BSO/DSJ) While Charlie Company was dealing with the enemy situation at 501N, the battalion, still at LZ 10B, was making plans to come to Charlie Company's aid. In just over a two hour period, the 1/12 decided to send in the remainder of its maneuver elements and requested aircraft support from brigade, who then diverted sufficient aircraft from the 1/22 to support the 1/12's request. The aircraft arrived, and Bravo Company prepared its men and equipment, loaded the first sortie, and lifted off. Finally, the company made all its reports to battalion, who then passed them on to brigade.

CPT Edward Scherer: "Charlie Company reported that its early morning perimeter sweeps with squad-sized patrols had made enemy contact in close proximity to its position. The intensity of the contact quickly grew as the morning progressed, prompting a decision by the battalion commander, LTC George Wilcox, to commit additional maneuver elements to join the battle. Bravo Company, under my command, was to be the first battalion element airlifted by helicopter into 501N. Upon landing, the company was to assemble, push south, then swing to the southwest of the LZ with the objective of engaging and destroying enemy forces in the area and securing overnight positions on Hill 346.


"The lead elements of Bravo Company were airborne shortly after 1100. We were scheduled to land in flights of three at 501N, which, at the time, was no larger than a three-ship LZ."

1015 (AAR) Back at LZ 501N, the enemy had apparently broken contact again, giving Charlie Company another breather and time to reorganize and deal with its problems.

LT Swan: "We organized and set up an aid station, and my guys, including myself, helped evacuate the wounded into our area. It was an hour or so before we finally got dust-offs in by having them come in low from across the small stream downhill from us. I remember talking to both SGTs Wessels and Raymond. Wessels had a gut wound, but was quite talkative and seemed in good spirits. Raymond seemed to be in much worse shape. When I heard later that both had died, I was shocked to learn later that Wessels hadn't made it, as he seemed to be in better shape than Raymond. So it goes with abdominal wounds."

SP4 Witt: "Another event that I remember happened later in the morning. I guess the guys in the bunker next to me spotted an NVA soldier about 20-to-30 yards out carrying an RPG and shot him. They figured he was down, but the RPG was still out there. One of the guys (who he was I don't know) volunteered to go out and get the weapon. They yelled over to me to warn me that he was going out. Soon, out he went, apparently unarmed and at a full run. He went through the undergrowth, found the RPG, grabbed it, and ran back in. I took his picture as he was running back to his bunker with the RPG."

Retrieving a B-40 Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher 15 February



Photograph courtesy Dennis Witt. An unidentified member of 2nd Platoon races back to the safety of his bunker after retrieving a B-40 rocket propelled grenade launcher dropped by an NVA soldier earlier during the attack. The concern was that another NVA might recover the weapon first and fire it at a bunker. This was one of eight rocket launchers recovered from the battlefield after the battle.

1030 (ZDN) 3rd Platoon, Charlie Company sent out a patrol to determine enemy activity. SSG Domingo's squad moved out from the perimeter in the same southwesterly direction from which it had returned earlier in the morning. About 700 feet from the perimeter, enemy machine guns opened up. SSG Domingo deployed his patrol on line and all 13 men assaulted the enemy soldiers, who were digging in for protection against the American artillery and air strikes. The squad killed seven of the enemy and captured three automatic weapons. The squad leader radioed his command post (CP) for additional instructions and was ordered to pull back to the perimeter.

1042 (DSJ) SITREP Charlie Company was receiving sporadic sniper fire from three or four individuals on the southwest side of the LZ. Friendly casualties [wounded and killed] were now at 10 personnel.

PFC Hedin: "One of the things I distinctly remember about the battle is SGT Panak moving up and down our portion of the perimeter that day. His fear was that we would be caught short of ammo if we were assaulted. He kept wanting us to conserve our ammo unless we could see targets. I remember some snipers in trees a long way off. I believe this is how SGT Carver was killed and LT Glick wounded. Carver and Glick were with the squad leaders making plans when Carver was hit. There was very little frontal assault against our portion of the perimeter that day, but I did expend enough ammo to have to reload my magazines."


1116 (DSJ) The Assistant Division Commander's (ADC) aircraft arrived at 2nd Brigade's dust-off pad with wounded from 1/12.

1130 (DSJ) An OH-13 light observation helicopter with the commander of the 2/8 Infantry aboard received sniper fire in the vicinity of YA 603550, LZ 501N. The aircraft was downed in the LZ and the commander's status was unknown.

CPT Northrop: "From the time contact was initiated, the 2/8 Battalion Commander, Colonel Duquemin, to whom we were still attached, urged us to get patrols out to assess the enemy situation. Then without warning, he attempted to land his OH-13 light observation helicopter just south of our perimeter. As he approached, his aircraft was taken under heavy enemy fire and crashed. He and his pilot were able to make it into one of our bunkers and remained there, pinned down for a couple of hours. Once the enemy fire lifted, Colonel Duquemin came into my command bunker where we discussed the situation. Soon thereafter he and his pilot were able to get a flight out. 1SG Pereda later placed a sign on the bunker in which the 2/8 commander had taken shelter that read 'Duquemin's Dugout.'"


SP4 Witt: "I remember the crash of the observation helicopter. I guess the Colonel wanted to be on the ground during the battle, so evidently he directed the pilot to land. Unfortunately, he chose to land just outside of the perimeter and in the same general area that the Hueys had flown over earlier. I watched as the little chopper approached, not believing they were actually going to land there. When they were about 30-to-40 feet from the ground, predictably, the jungle opened up on them. I saw both men exit the chopper BEFORE it hit the ground and run for the nearest bunker on the perimeter. (I heard later

A Crashed OH-13 Helicopter Photo Taken on 16 February



Photograph courtesy Melvin Faber. The OH-13 observation helicopter in which Colonel Duquemin, commanding officer of the 2/8 Infantry, was riding when he decided to visit LZ 501N at the height of the battle. The aircraft crash-landed outside the perimeter at about 1115 on the 15th. Both the commander and the pilot escaped serious injury. The helicopter continued to run for some time after it crashed. Eventually small arms fire killed the engine.

A Crashed UH-1B Helicopter Photo taken on 16 February



Photograph courtesy Melvin Faber. The UH-1B, aircraft #800, was a part of Bravo Company's first sortie. It was hit by enemy ground fire on final approach and crash-landed near the center of the LZ at about 1130 on the 15th. Many around the perimeter saw it get hit and crash. One door gunner was killed and the pilot injured. Carrying members of Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon, all escaped unharmed. SP4 Faber was standing near the 81mm mortar firing point when he took this picture on the 16th. Note the empty ammunition tubes for the mortar at the bottom of the photograph.

that the 2/8 commander had to spend quite some time in the bunker before he could get out.)

"As the pilot exited the helicopter, he didn't bother to turn it off. So, when it hit the ground, it continued to run and run and run. It must have run on its own for an hour or so. I think both sides were shooting at it in the end just to make it STOP running."

SGT Rodney Ray, a squad leader in the recon platoon, also recalls the OH-13 incident: "When the observation helicopter tried to land, it was shot-up by the NVA. When the pilot and the battalion commander bailed out, the helicopter just sat there and idled. After awhile the sound got on everybody's nerves, and guys started shooting at it in an attempt to kill the engine. It took quite a few hits before the engine finally stopped."

PFC Hedin: "I remember the helicopters. The Huey that crashed was behind my bunker and to the left. How far would have to be a guess, but it wasn't too far. The small helicopter was not visible to me, but it about drove us crazy just setting out there running."

SP4 Witt: "I also saw the Huey shot down that day. It was one of a group of three attempting to come into the perimeter with reinforcements from Bravo Company. The problem was they chose to approach the fire base from the direction that would take them directly over what I figured was the main strength of the enemy. When they dropped to within 75-to-100 feet above the ground and were just about over the perimeter, the whole jungle opened up on them. Two peeled off, but one rocked back and forth, then tipped sideways in the air, and crashed inside the perimeter. I never saw it hit the ground because I knew it was going to crash pretty close behind my bunker and felt that the bottom of the bunker was the place to be when it did hit. (I found later that a gunner was killed and the pilot was injured.)"

CPT Scherer: "I was in the second flight inbound from the north to the LZ when I observed one ship from the lead flight hit by enemy fire, causing it to crash onto the LZ. I also could see a light observation helicopter down on the southwestern edge of the LZ, apparently disabled by enemy fire. With one of our lead helicopters already down, burning, and blocking part of the LZ, we were forced to continue our insertion by flights of two, which extended the operational time it took to close the remainder of Bravo Company."

CPT Northrop: "When CPT Scherer arrived with Bravo Company, I was the senior guy on the ground. Bravo's arrival was piecemeal and complicated by one of their helicopters being shot down. It crashed somewhat near the center of the LZ and restricted the size of the landing space for the subsequent helicopters. We initially placed the Bravo Company men within some of our bunkers to reinforce the positions where the enemy forces seemed to be most concentrated."

1145 (DSJ) Charlie Company told all inbound aircraft to hold touchdowns on their LZ due to intense ground fire coming from the hill southwest of the LZ (Hill 346). One aircraft, #800, had already been damaged and had crash-landed at the LZ, while four others that were also hit made it back to the landing pad at 3-Tango. Further lifts were temporarily halted pending air and artillery preparation of the enemy positions. Approximately 30

personnel from Bravo Company were inserted into the Charlie Company position, along with a small arms ammunition resupply, before the insertion was aborted.

SSG Cliff Shaver: "What a day it turned out to be! Kohler and I had two slicks shot out from under us that day. We finally got into the LZ on a third that came to pick us up on a hill top where a 155mm artillery battery was located. This particular slick was sent from Camp Holloway. When I approached the crew chief, I told him that I did not want to make an approach to 501N as if we were landing at SFO or LAX. What a ride! Contour flying is interesting. And what great machine operators! Two of the other people who were on our sortie were Martin Frank and SGT Thudus Clayton, my 1st Squad Leader. I can't remember any others, but they were all 3rd Platoon. I must have had one of the RTO's with me, probably Marvin Dew, as I believe Ronald Johnson may have been on R&R during this time."

SP5 Harrison Kohler: "I was one of the last ones out of my sortie to arrive because the first two helicopters I rode in were shot-up trying to land. Both times we were flown back to get a new helicopter. On the third try we landed safely in the LZ."

CPT Scherer: "With 3rd Platoon on the ground along with my command group, and in coordination with CPT Northrop, I decided to maneuver my 3rd Platoon outside the LZ in an attempt to outflank the enemy positions (essentially to the southwest and west of 501N), in order to reduce enemy fire brought to bear on the LZ. At about 1230 the 3rd Platoon, led by acting platoon leader SSG Cliff Shaver, departed Charlie Company's perimeter to the east, maneuvered to the south, and then westward, putting them about 200 meters south of Charlie Company's perimeter.

"At 1300 while moving westward, 3rd Platoon's lead element came under heavy automatic weapons and small-arms fire, which immediately inflicted friendly casualties and caused the platoon to deploy and engage an enemy force of unknown size.

1325 - 1500 (DSJ/BSO) Bravo Company's second sortie of 12 aircraft lifted off at 10B and, after a 20-minute flight, attempted to make an insertion into 501N. Approaching from the east per Charlie Company's guidance, only one aircraft was able to make it in. The remainder of the sortie aborted their mission due to heavy enemy ground fire. It was only after additional air and artillery fires were placed on the enemy positions that the remainder of the second sortie was able to complete their insertion.

PFC Kevin Watson: "I was in Bravo Company's weapons platoon and assigned to its 1st squad. Flying into 501N, it looked like an Army junk yard down below with all the aircraft wreckage strewn about - - a Huey and a light observation helicopter. This was a hot LZ; all the smoke and dust, mortar, automatic weapons, sniper, and heavy machine gun fire left little doubt. The atmosphere was pumped up like I had never seen before.

"After some fast running and dodging as soon I exited the aircraft, I made it over to a high point near the landing pad and joined others from the weapons platoon near the fire direction center (FDC). Located in the only bunker I could see inside the perimeter, the FDC bunker was jammed with people trying to find cover. After dumping my part of our

mortar and adding my three high explosive 81mm rounds to the pile of ammunition being collected, I did like the rest of the guys not under cover and stayed low to the ground outside the bunker. I remember thinking, while looking around, that the position was so open, it would have probably been better suited for an M-60 machine gun than an 81mm mortar."

PFC Jim McMillion: "The FSB had moved from 10B, and Bravo Company was there alone as they started their combat assault out of 10B for 501N. One of the supporting lift choppers was hit coming into 501N during the first sortie, and crash-landed inside the perimeter. Thus, the next lifts out of 10B for Bravo Company were one chopper short. This meant that one squad had to be left behind at 10B; I don't know how we were picked, but soon we were all alone. For a while, a couple of gunships buzzed around us, then they too finally departed for 501N. We waited on the 10B LZ for about 30 minutes. Finally a lone chopper came back to get us. It was a rather short flight to 501N. We approached from the east, passed the north side of the perimeter, and landed on the western low-side of the LZ.

"Coming into 501N, I remember thinking that it looked like an old dumping ground. Smoke was rising from various fires and stuff was strewn around all over the place. A little southwest of center sat a Huey that had been shot down earlier. We landed on the lowest western side of 501N where it was a little protected from the fighting that was going on along the south side of the perimeter. There was lots of shooting going on and explosions of one sort or another. This was my first exposure to combat, and I hadn't learned to differentiate between AK-47 and M-16 fire yet. I do remember bullets zinging overhead though. Finally the firing died down, and we were able to move our 81mm mortar over near the northwest corner of the new FSB, but didn't set it up because we weren't sure if we were going to move out or not.

"The choppers were still bringing in supplies and dumping them on the LZ. The LZ area was composed of knee-high dry grass, dead branches, and small brush that was burning intensely. Small arms ammo and an occasional grenade were exploding in the fire. I, along with several others, was detailed to start hauling all this stuff out of the fire. One guy in the group was wounded when a grenade went off, but I don't know how bad. To make matters worse, as each resupply chopper came in, it fanned the fires, making them impossible to put out."

1505 (DSJ) The division G3 decided to shift a B-52 strike to an area less than three kilometers west of Charlie Company's location. The G3 requested concurrence.

PFC Douglas Philipps: "The aircraft I was riding in arrived at approximately 1530 while the fighting was still going on. As I exited the aircraft, I could see that two other choppers had crashed within the LZ area.

"Due to enemy fire, many of the boxes of mortar ammunition and hand grenades, which had arrived earlier and were piled up at the landing pad, were on fire. Several other weapons platoon men and I worked feverishly among the exploding hand grenades to save the mortar rounds and other ammunition, all the while being fired on by the enemy."

1535 - 1600 (DSJ/AAR) Bravo Company's third and last sortie of 10 aircraft lifted off. After a short flight and no further interference from the enemy, the company was finally able to complete its insertion into 501N.

CPT Scherer: "As the engagement with 3rd Platoon was developing, my 1st and 2nd Platoons, along with elements of the weapons platoon, were now on the ground at 501N. At about 1615, leaving the weapons platoon at the LZ to establish mortar support, my command group and two rifle platoons deployed and moved in the direction of our engaged 3rd Platoon.

"The use of our own organic 81mm mortar, especially in support of 3rd Platoon, was also invaluable and was effectively brought to within 50 meters or closer of our positions. It was especially effective during the early stages of our engagement when other fire support was not available or could not be brought in close enough. I recall that as the main body of Bravo Company was preparing to depart 501N to join our 3rd Platoon, our mortar section was firing a mission in support of our 3rd Platoon when a 'short round' was announced, causing everyone to seek cover. After the mortar round landed on its intended target some 200 meters from the mortar position, we determined that the observer who hollered 'short round' had followed the round as it was leaving the tube and since the round was fired at 'zero' charge, it appeared to be coming back onto the gun position. The subsequent explosion of the round outside the perimeter and a call to 'fire for effect' from 3rd Platoon was very reassuring.


"At 1625 hours, the lead elements of the company linked up with 3rd Platoon, at which time the entire company became engaged by the enemy with a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons on our southern flank and to the rear or east of our formation."

SP4 Melvin Faber: "This was a long day and night. When the weapons platoon finally got into the FSB with Charlie Company, we set up only one 81mm mortar. I don't remember who was on the sights, who was the ammo bearer, or who cut the charges, but I do remember SGT Case giving me the elevation and deflection settings from the FDC. I would repeat the settings to the man on the sights who would confirm them on the gun. The assistant gunner would then drop the round down the tube and fire it. There was so much noise, I sometimes couldn't hear SGT Case and I had to ask him to repeat the firing data. Firing 'zero' charge, you didn't want to make any mistakes.

"The tube finally got so hot from the continually firing that we had to 'pour water' on it to cool it off (we didn't want any rounds cooking off). The steam was a good indication of just how hot the tube really was. As we were firing only one tube, the remainder of the weapons platoon rotated between our firing position and the perimeter; they needed help badly on the line."

CPT Scherer: "At this point Bravo Company was being effectively engaged by the enemy from three sides, with only our northern flank nearest to the Charlie Company perimeter not engaged. We were taking casualties: there were several KIA along with a number of WIA, some of whom were being covered by enemy fire when attempts were being made to recover and evacuate them. One of the forward observer radio operators accompanying

Bravo Company's Movement To Contact 15 February



Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon became pinned down soon after departing the LZ on the afternoon of the 15th. When the remainder of Bravo Company finally linked up with 3rd Platoon just before dusk, the NVA attempted to encircle the company. As soon as Alpha Company completed their insertion into the LZ, they were rushed out to provide a covering screen for Bravo Company, enabling Bravo to break contact with the enemy and return to the LZ. By 2000, both companies were safely back inside the perimeter.

the command group was shot in the head and died next to me within moments. During the ensuing engagement, enemy fire continued to keep the company pinned down. Several efforts to use fire and maneuver produced more casualties. Target acquisition was difficult due to the enemy's effective use of concealment and cover, and the multiplicity of locations from which they were delivering both small-arms and automatic weapons fire. Friendly artillery and air support, as well as organic mortar fire, were brought in to support our engagement.

"Initially, there were problems with fire support coordination. This was due, for the most part, to mixed priorities in command and control. There was a deliberate commitment to reinforce and close all elements of the battalion into the FSB before dark. This decision was apparently based on the developing battlefield situation, which suggested the Red Warriors were engaging an NVA unit of battalion size or larger at the time, perhaps reminiscent of the 1st Cavalry's engagement in the la Drang a year earlier. As a result, air traffic around the landing was congested with flight patterns of lift aircraft, often conflicting with the gun-target lines of artillery and mortars, causing intermittent cease fires. These cessations of supporting fires varied in length and were often dictated by the presence of various lift aircraft attempting to deliver supplies and troops into the LZ, and were further complicated by battlefield clutter - - downed helicopters, ammunition pallets on fire and exploding, and sling loads of supplies needing to be moved within the landing site, not to mention the concentration of enemy fire on the LZ.

"Despite these early battlefield complications, our use of supporting fire proved to be most effective and decisive. Initially, artillery support from 155mm howitzers and air support with F104s were employed; however the proximity of the enemy to friendly forces precluded bringing this firepower to bear on the enemy without risk of significant friendly casualties. These weapons systems were more effectively employed for blocking fires and harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires throughout most of the engagement. The availability of A1E Hobos (propeller-driven aircraft of Korean War vintage) from nearby Pleiku proved to be most effective in delivering truly close air support. These A1E aircraft delivered both napalm and cluster bomb unit ordnance within 100 meters of our positions. This particular air support seemed to be decisive in suppressing enemy fire on our positions because the ordnance was delivered accurately and consistently over an extended period of time."

PFC Hedin: "The jets and other aircraft were our saviors of the battle. They were very scary for a small town kid like me, but I can distinctly remember them screaming in to our defense. They were dropping small bombs, at first directly in front of my position on the perimeter. We were all impressed and felt the immense power that was present. Then the bombs started getting bigger, and as they tumbled from the jets, they became scarier with every pass. With each explosion, we were showered with dust from the bunker sandbags. Then someone came down the line telling us to stay down because the bombs were coming in closer. This was one of the most terrifying moments in Vietnam for me. The jets were no longer flying parallel to us, but were flying directly at us as they released their bombs. It was ear-splitting and ground-shaking at the same time. Then the unexpected happened -- napalm. We had no idea it was coming, and had never seen it dropped before. I can still see those silver tubes coming down, and then the fire and heat that swept across our bunker. Jim Thronson was a nervous guy, and believed he would die in

Vietnam. [Editor's note: He didn't.] All of us were lower than what should have been physically possible inside that bunker. Later we found that a good portion of the plastic sand bags on the roof and front had melted away; only the dirt we had filled them with was left (give me the burlap ones any time). But even with this damage, our bunker was one of the best on the perimeter. The fact that we had such good bunkers speaks highly of our chain of command. I have to wonder what would have happened to us if we were not made to build such good bunkers every day in the field."

SP4 Jerry Salavec: "Cliff Shaver was the platoon sergeant for 3rd Platoon. I was on the radio with him when we fired all those rounds, many of which were charge 'zero' and at maximum elevation."

PFC Watson: "One of our Bravo Company platoons had become trapped by the enemy outside the perimeter while conducting a patrol. I don't remember exactly how long we had been on the ground, but someone yelled 'Fire Mission!' and guys began to move quickly. Because of the chaotic situation and the fact that we had only one gun, the crew wound up being composed of members of the 1st and 2nd squads. It was a case of the guys pulling together and doing what had to be done. Everybody pitched in and got the job done. I don't remember exactly what each man did, as many of the men took turns at different jobs throughout the evening and night, but I do remember SP4 Faber leading the combined gun crew. As soon as the mortar was assembled, several rounds were fired rapidly to settle the base plate. We were firing charge 'zero,' and one of the rounds didn't look right as it came out of the tube. Someone yelled 'Short-round!' and everyone sprinted away. After seeing that the round went where it was intended, everyone returned to the gun and resumed the fire mission.

"With all the small arms firing going on around us (the NVA were spraying the area between the gun and the FDC with automatic weapons fire) and the NVA 82mm mortar rounds exploding all over the LZ, it was impossible to hear. On top of that, we did not have radio communications between the FDC and the gun crew; thus we could not hear the fire mission data being yelled at us by SGT Case in the FDC. To fix this and to make sure we made no mistakes, SP4 Faber would make SGT Case repeat every elevation and deflection change he gave us. With the NVA trying to hug our perimeter and us firing at 'zero' charge, there was no room for error; we did not want to kill our own troops. This went on for hours, during which we were continually exposed to heavy enemy fire. I remember that the platoon leader from the patrol came over afterwards and thanked the gun crew for our efforts."

PFC McMillion: "In the middle of the afternoon a patrol from Bravo Company was sent out to sweep along the southwest side of the perimeter. It quickly walked into an ambush and was pinned down. Our squad, 2nd Squad, along with a couple of guys for the FDC, were the only ones from the weapons platoon left behind with an 81mm mortar, and it was still dismantled. The rest of the weapons platoon had been taken either to help man some of the perimeter bunkers, or had been sent out on patrol with the rest of the company. The members of my squad included SGT James Ingram, SP4 Doug Philipps, SP4 Ron Beilfuss, myself, PFC Frank Lackey, and PFC Bill Kichman. The FDC was manned by SP4 Jerry Salavec, PFC Jaffy, and one other guy (whose name I can't recall).

"The Bravo Company patrol was pinned down about 150 yards to the south-southwest of us. The patrol was in big trouble, judging by the volume of small-arms fire. I'd been incountry about two months and had no idea what to do. Our little group of mortarmen were huddled near the radio listening to the company traffic. It didn't sound good. I had no combat experience whatsoever. Like so many of the replacements coming into Vietnam at the time, I'd taken my advance infantry training at Fort Polk's 'Tigerland.' As an '11-Charlie,' I had been trained to set up and operate the 81mm mortar in less than a minute. In training, the parts of the 81 would be lying separately on the ground in front of us. On command, everyone in our squad would grab their assigned part(s), run a few steps, stop, and put the gun together. This included setting out the aiming stakes, applying the elevation and direction, sighting on the reference point, and leveling everything. In training we spent hours every day just going through the routine of setting up the mortar. All 11-Charlies go through the same training. Even though the idea of setting up a gun as fast as we were supposed to got boring, seemed ridiculous, and no believed that there was any reason for it, we really did get good at it. The whole process started with the two word command 'Fire Mission.'

"Suddenly the two key words 'Fire Mission!' were blurted out over the weapons platoon radio. One moment I had no idea what to do, and the next we were all responding to training. Repeating the command 'Fire Mission,' I grabbed the bipod for the 81, ran about ten steps and flung it open. Everyone else was right beside me with the other parts of the gun. It was just like in training. Doug Philipps was at my left side breaking out the sight, while Ron Beilfuss slipped the tube into the bipod. As I pushed in the pin to lock the tube to the 'pod,' Ron took the tube from me saying, 'This is my job,' and it was. He had just recently been made the assistant gunner. Doug Philipps was the gunner, SGT Ingram was the squad leader, and I was an ammo bearer.

"At first we used only the center of the base plate for the 81. Everything went like clockwork in spite of the fact that there was a battle going on. I don't think I've ever worked with a better bunch of guys. It's hard to describe on paper the teamwork that went on in those few moments that it took to get the gun set up. Someone had the compass out, while someone else risked running out 15 or 20 meters to place the aiming stake in the ground. It wasn't straight up and down like it should have been, but we used it anyway. The FDC yelled out the direction, range, and charge setting. While Doug and Ron got the gun oriented, I broke open a round of high explosive (HE) and pulled the safety pin and charges. We were firing at such a close range that the tube was almost straight up. The old HE rounds that we were using had eight powder charges on them. With all the charges attached to the round, it had a range of about 5000 meters. The closer the target was to the gun, the more charges were pulled from the round. We were firing a charge 'zero.' This meant that the only thing propelling the round out of the tube was the shotgun-shell primer. We were firing at absolute minimum range.

"I dropped the first round, and it came out of the tube wobbling. It went straight up, turned over and looked like it was coming back down at us. Someone yelled 'Short-Round!' and we dove for cover. To our relief, the round landed right where it was supposed to, about 100 meters to the southwest of the perimeter. Doug re-leveled the gun, while I pulled the charges and the safety pin from the next round.

"Then the forward observer (FO) out in the jungle [SSG Cliff Shaver, the 3rd platoon Platoon Sergeant] yelled over the radio 'Cease fire!' He told us that the round was too close to our people and that a piece of shrapnel may have hit one of our own guys. We just stood there for a few moments thinking that we had really screwed up. Then the FO was back on the radio telling us: 'That round knocked out a 'Charlie' machine gun, fire for effect.' I remember thinking 'My gosh, we wounded one of our own people and now they want us to fire for effect, they're calling the mortars in on top of themselves!' Beilfuss and I took turns dropping the rounds. Philipps re-adjusted the gun after every shot. It seems like we fired for hours like that. Round after round of HE, hundreds of rounds. Periodically the FDC would call out a new setting and we would re-align the gun and resume firing. At one point I thought we were receiving sniper fire, as bullets were zinging past awfully close. Then we had a 'hung' round in the tube. Even though we had been firing charge 'zero,' the tube was so hot that we had to use empty sandbags to protect our hands while lifting the tube out of the baseplate so that it could be tipped over to get the stuck round to slide out. One of the 3rd Squad guys caught it. We fired our gun until we were out of HE.

"Planes were coming in and dropping napalm and butterfly bombs just outside the perimeter. I'm not sure if this happened before we started firing the 81 or during the fire mission. It seems to me it was both. The jets and some other type of plane were there earlier in the afternoon. They came back again after Bravo Company made contact outside the perimeter.

"Another time during the afternoon, a dust-off almost drifted over our position while taking out some of the wounded. I could see a Hispanic guy from one of the line platoons standing in the doorway. He had been hit several times in the legs and was struggling with the crew chief who was trying to keep him from jumping back out of the aircraft. They finally got him subdued, and the helicopter departed. I never saw this guy again and have no idea what ever happened to him. I knew his name at the time, but have since forgotten it."

PFC Edward Moody: "We landed under intense enemy mortar, machine gun, and B-40 rocket fire. The situation was real hectic, as we had not had time to set up our radios from platoon to the command group. All orders were being given by voice, person-to-person.

"Later that day Bravo Company's third platoon was conducting a sweep of the perimeter when it came under enemy machine gun and rocket fire, and was pinned down. I was part of the gun crew on the only 81mm mortar that had arrived with Bravo Company.

"As squad leader, Melvin Faber was in charge of this particular gun crew. We received a 'fire mission.' Having no landline or radios in operation, Melvin had responsibility for getting the sight settings from the FDC to the gun crew. Our gun site was situated on a small rise with no cover or protection. Melvin ignored any danger to himself and stayed out in the open, directing the crew's efforts and the fire mission. Because of all the firing, the noise was so loud, it was almost impossible to hear the fire commands being given.

"Melvin had a lot of responsibility riding on his shoulders. The third platoon and the NVA were very close to each other. Every round had to be fired with precision to avoid killing

our own men. We fired over 200 rounds of high explosive in a short period of time without having any short rounds.

"Melvin's actions that day demonstrated his outstanding leadership skills. His courage under fire enabled us to successfully free our trapped third platoon and save many lives. After the battle, we were all congratulated by the company commander, CPT Scherer, for a job well done."

1540 - 1715 (DSJ) Chinooks carrying Bravo Battery 4/42 lifted off from 10B bound for the 2/8 FSB. Over the course of two hours and eight sorties, the battery was able to get its howitzers, ammunition, men, and supplies and equipment moved without incident to a temporary, safe location pending the outcome of the battle at 501N.

1645 - 1710 (DSJ/AAR) In a series of situation reports to battalion, Charlie Company reported that they were still receiving sporadic sniper fire from the south side of their perimeter, and that they had 14 wounded and two dead, as well as one wounded and one dead from the crashed helicopter within their perimeter.

1720 (AAR) Company A, the battalion CP, and all 81mm mortars and 4.2 inch mortars closed into the LZ.

CPT Northrop: "The arrival of Alpha Company forced us once again to realign the perimeter to accommodate a third company. Needless to say, the LZ was crammed!

"The battalion headquarters was the last element to arrive that day. They had been delayed earlier due to the intensity of the fighting. With the battalion CP finally in position, we were released from our OPCON status with the 2/8 and reverted back to 1/12 control. At this point, all decisions regarding the defense of the perimeter were taken out of my hands. I had been sleeping, and shortly after their arrival I received a call to go to the battalion CP for guidance. When I arrived I was asked what I thought we should do next. We discussed a possible mission to go after an almost-destroyed enemy force. I felt we needed to block the possible avenues of escape with airmobile assaults and artillery fire, then send a couple of companies after them. At one point I even thought that battalion should have dropped Alpha Company between the enemy forces and the Cambodian border as a blocking force to cut off their withdrawal."

CPT Scherer: "About 1800 hours, the battalion commander ordered Bravo Company to return to 501N, apparently to consolidate the battalion's position in anticipation of a large-scale enemy attack."

1830 - (AAR/DSJ) Company B encountered heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire in the rear portion of their formation southwest of the FSB, and Alpha Company was sent out to provide Bravo Company assistance in breaking contact with the enemy and returning to the perimeter.

CPT Scherer: "While supporting fires had effectively reduced and suppressed the volume of enemy fire, Bravo was continuing to receive heavy fire whenever we attempted to

maneuver against the enemy positions, or to make efforts to retrieve our dead and wounded. Several attempts were also being made by the enemy to envelop our northern flank to prevent our movement back to the LZ, which would have effectively caused Bravo Company to be surrounded. To assist in our maneuver back into the FSB, Alpha Company established a blocking position to the east to prevent the enemy's envelopment of our flank, and to provide a corridor to effect passage of our company back into the battalion's perimeter."

1915 - 2000 (DSJ/AAR) Both Bravo and Alpha Companies closed back into the LZ. Bravo closed first, followed quickly by Alpha Company.

CPT Scherer: "Around 1900 and under the cover of darkness, Bravo Company was able to start retrieving its casualties. Shortly thereafter contact was broken with the enemy, and by 2000 the company had closed back into the battalion perimeter."

SP5 Kohler: "In the late afternoon I had gone into the woodline with the company to try to evacuate our dead and wounded. It was after dark before I returned to the LZ. The last man to be evacuated that night was Wayne Card, who was mortally wounded, although he was alive when we got him back into the LZ. We recovered everyone except for SGT Carkin. We found his body the next morning."

SP4 Faber: "I remember firing white phosphorous rounds toward the end of the attack. I was the squad leader on the one gun all day and night. I don't remember McMillion or Beilfuss that well, as they were replacements. I do remember Philipps; we took Basic Unit Training at Fort Lewis together. If anyone deserved a medal that day, he did. I talked to him years later and found out that he did get one."

PFC Watson: "Later in the evening, SP4 Faber directed us through another very successful fire mission. After being detailed to help recover a wounded man, I returned to my firing position and squad to find that they were saturating the area to our front with a grid fire mission. We were firing the only ammunition we had left, which was white phosphorus. This fire mission lasted at least two hours."

PFC McMillion: "Just before dark the NVA launched an attack from the east-southeast. The guys on the east side of the perimeter started yelling and disappearing into their bunkers. We sat and watched in amazement as people disappeared in a wave that started on the east side and swept along to the north side of the perimeter. One guy on the perimeter kept yelling at us to find cover. I clearly remember him looking at us and yelling, then looking out at the jungle, then back at us, then out at the jungle again. Then he too finally disappeared into his bunker. We sat right out in the open like we had been doing all afternoon. With no one else in sight at this point, we felt very much alone. For the second time that afternoon I thought that we were about to be overrun. I remember thinking, 'In about five minutes, we will all be dead.'

"Instead of finding shelter, the mixed crew on the gun swung it around and aimed it to the east, the direction the NVA were coming from. As we were still out of HE, we began firing white phosphorous rounds. I think we had about 400 rounds of that stuff that had been

brought in. I don't think we even used the sight at first. We just started lobbing rounds out into the jungle about 100 yards or so and walked them in towards the perimeter. We walked the rounds up and down, and back and forth. It finally got dark and we were still at it. We worked the area over with a methodical grid of pure Hell. There is nothing eerier than seeing WP going off at night at close range. I remember thinking, 'This is what Hell has to be like.' When we finally got a 'cease fire' well after dark, the battle was over. A sickening stillness set in over 501N. Fires burned at various points around the perimeter. The air was filled with a thick smoke that settled over us like fog settling over a marsh on a cool summer night. It smelled not only of wood smoke, but of white phosphorous and death itself. No one had anything to say. We were all exhausted. While some people broke open some C-rations, others just sat around staring at far-off points that didn't seem to be in our present world. For the first time that day we had a chance to reflect upon what had taken place. Everyone seemed to be lost in his own thoughts."

CPT Northrop: "Around 2000, Cider 26 returned to our location with a 'Spooky,' a C-47 flare-ship, that provided us with illumination and fire support most of the night. They were able to place an unbelievable amount of fire on the enemy. Watching the long streams of tracers from the aircraft's Gatling-styled machine guns come down out of the night sky was almost mesmerizing. Cider 26 also directed more air strikes and artillery. His efforts during the last few hours of the battle were no less valuable than those earlier in the day. The effectiveness of close air support was clearly demonstrated that day. I can't even begin to measure their total contribution to the outcome of this battle. I do know there were 113 enemy dead within 75 meters of the our perimeter, and in my judgment over 50% were killed by the air strikes."

"Throughout all of this, 1SG Pereda was my right and left hands. He truly was a remarkable man. I commanded the maneuver elements, air support, and artillery. The 1SG handled re-supply, food, ammo, WIAs, KIAs and morale. At one point I remember telling the 1SG the CPT Carpenter story (calling artillery on his own position as he was being overrun by the enemy) as I felt we might be soon faced with a similar situation -- the enemy was already within hand grenade and Claymore mine range. I had already fired my pistol several times, and that is not something a company commander needs to be doing. (I don't think I hit anything!) At one point the 1SG even got a little personal with me when he threw me to the floor of the command bunker. A sniper in a nearby tree had taken a shot at us and managed to hit my air mattress laid out on a shelf.

"On a sad and tragic note, we had a young soldier, who was severely wounded, crawl into the CP with us during the battle. We couldn't figure out how he got there. It about did me in when he died in my arms. The 1SG picked him up and carried him to a position outside and just to the rear of our bunker. Later on he was moved to the landing pad with the other dead and eventually evacuated.

"Something that is not often talked about by many is the 'battlefield din.' At 501N I would have described it as borderline chaotic, not with lack of control, but by the sheer volume of noise from gunships, Hueys, and screaming jets; 155mm and 8 inch artillery; 500-pound bombs; 20 and 40mm guns; machine gun and rifle fire; hand grenades and rocket propelled grenades; and mortars. Then add to that the mix of smoke and flames from the

napalm, burning woods, a burning helicopter, and all the explosions. Then somewhere amidst all of that the radios are blaring wanting to know what is going on; medivacs are wanting information on the WIAs; platoon leaders are making reports and asking for help; the artillery are requesting adjustments and target effects; air strikes are rolling in; and people are yelling and screaming. Then in the back of your mind you can hear the wounded moaning and asking for help, and because the enemy is so close, you can hear them yelling at each other too. Your mind is almost frantic trying to process and sort all of this noise and still make the right decision at the right moment, because you can never forget that you know every man in your company, and you know they are all depending on you. Knowing that you are losing men is gut-wrenching. This factor alone makes command a very lonely experience."

PART IV THE AFTERMATH

Part IV: The Aftermath

16 February (Thursday)

0100 (AAR) The enemy again mortared the LZ; however, the rapid employment of the Bravo Company counter mortar fire quieted the enemy mortars after they fired an estimated 30 rounds, most of which fell outside the perimeter.

PFC Watson: "Sometime after midnight we fired our last fire mission of the night, a counter-mortar fire. With just a few rounds we were able to knock out an enemy 82mm mortar that was believed to be firing a prep for another ground attack."

0115 - 0500 (DSJ) The battalion spent the remainder of the night after the enemy mortar attack listening to the sounds the enemy was making south of the perimeter and calling in hourly situation reports to brigade. At around 0115, the S3 requested air support in response to all the sounds of enemy digging. Spooky, who had been on station dropping flares, fired a burst of machine gun fire to identify the battalion's location for a sortie of aircraft that were inbound and couldn't find the battalion in the dark. By 0315, A1E Hobos had delivered their ordnance and were making strafing runs on the enemy positions.

Thinking ahead to the next morning, CPT Jerry White, the battalion S3, called brigade and asked that visitors be held to a minimum until the battalion had time to conduct its sweeps and make sure the area was safe to fly back into. Battalion didn't want any more aircraft shot down.

The enemy forces south of the battalion's perimeter were persistent. At 0500 they could still be heard digging even after the air strikes and artillery. Battalion had Spooky return and remain on station until daylight.

As "early morning nautical twilight" (EMNT) was less than an hour away (0552), and after hearing digging and movement sounds from the enemy outside the perimeter throughout the night, battalion began stand-to early to ensure they were prepared this time in the event the enemy tried another ground attack at dawn, as they had the previous morning.

PFC Salavec: "Bravo Company spent the night of the 15th in the LZ. I remember sleeping on the ground and not having time to dig in. Also a 500 pound bomb went off sometime during the night. Our 1SG (I don't remember his name) came around before dawn warning of an NVA attack, which never came."

0600 (DSJ) Battalion sent a situation report to brigade indicating there was no contact with the enemy forces. As soon as it was light enough to see (sunrise was at 0614), each company was tasked to send out a sweep. Not only did battalion want to know what the enemy was doing, but they wanted the missing men from Bravo and Charlie Companies found as quickly as possible in the event that they were still alive. Bravo Company's sweep was productive in that they determined that the enemy had departed the immediate area and had left behind numerous dead and a couple of their wounded soldiers. Bravo also recovered their missing man.

SP5 Kohler: "The next morning we swept in front of at least part of the perimeter. I believe that Alpha Company was also part of the sweep. We recovered SGT Harvey Carkin's body. He was the only one of our KIAs who was not recovered the night before. We also captured two or three wounded NVA. During the sweep there was an 81mm short-round. Alex Boyd was wounded, though not seriously."

PFC McMillion: "The next morning Bravo Company made a sweep of the area with two groups. The group that I was with started out on the north side of the perimeter and worked its way toward the base of the big hill we were sitting on. I found a dead NVA who had a bullet hole through the side of his head. I stepped over him and went on. In a creek bottom a guy from one of the line platoons showed me where he had taken cover the day before while an NVA machine gunner had raked the ground above the creek bank. He also showed me the tree that an NVA had hidden behind. The tree was only about eight inches in diameter, but his M-16 wouldn't shoot through it."

The mission and results of Charlie Company's sweep were similar to Bravo's.

CPT Northrop: "As soon as it was light enough, sweeps went back out again. My 1st Platoon's mission was to find and recover Willett and Carkin, whom we presumed were dead. When the patrol found their bodies, I was relieved to find out that they had not been captured. Losing a live soldier to the enemy is one of the worst concerns a commander can have."

SP4 Witt: "At first light, the morning sweeps were sent out around the LZ. As I recall, they had two missions: to determine if the NVA were still in the area, and to recover American KIAs who had died outside the perimeter the day before."


0715 (DSJ) Colonel Adamson reported to be en route to the 1/12.

As soon as it was deemed safe to do so, battalion immediately began calling for medivacs to take out the wounded and dead, and for re-supplies to be brought in.

SP4 Witt, on radio watch at his company CP, had a front row seat and witnessed the recovery of one of his company's KIAs: "I remember watching them bring in one KIA on a stretcher covered with a poncho. They re-entered the perimeter near our CP bunker and laid him on the ground. Just as they did that, a Chinook flew into the LZ with re-supplies, passing quite close to where I was standing.

"As it approached, everyone turned their backs to it to protect themselves from the windblasted dirt and gravel generated by the rotors. As I braced myself against the wind, I was looking directly toward the covered body lying on the ground. As I stood there, I helplessly watched the rotor-wind blow the poncho off the body. It was the first, and thankfully the last, American KIA I ever saw. He was lying face down and appeared to just be sleeping. I felt so bad at that moment at the 'disrespect' of that poncho being blown off, and so much anger at the loss of a young life. I couldn't help it. Shortly after the Chinook left, the guys nearest to him respectfully replaced the poncho back over him, picked him up, and carried him over to the landing pad to be taken home."

Chinooks to the Rescue 16 February



Photograph courtesy Dennis Witt. CH-47 Chinook helicopters bringing in much-needed supplies and ammunition on the morning of the 16th. The large bunker in the foreground is the Charlie Company command post. Later in the day, these same aircraft brought in Bravo Battery, 4/42 Artillery. With the addition of the artillery, the LZ became a fire support base that was "bursting at the seams" with men and equipment.

As the battalion sweeps went out that morning, nobody knew what they might run into; thus everybody was prepared for the worst. It was only as the morning progressed that it became clear that the enemy had withdrawn from the battlefield. Luckily, only scattered and light contact was made.

1044 (DSJ) SITREP B/1/12 made enemy contact and was receiving automatic weapons fire. PFC Wayne Card died of wounds received on the 15th.

PFC McMillion: "The most NVA bodies I saw that day were where the NVA had been hitting the perimeter at the base of the big hill on the south side. They had been within 25 meters of the perimeter and had at least three machine guns, one a heavy 51 caliber, some B-40 rocket launchers, and AK-47's. There was also an M-16 rifle with them. SGT Montgomery was cutting the web gear off of one of the bodies when I walked up. Nearby we found SGT Carkin's body. He was about 15-to-20 yards behind the NVA, and between some fallen trees. I later heard that he had died just as our point people came upon him. He had been hit in the wrist by a 'butterfly' bomb fragment and had his wrist tied up with his bandana. I think he also had other wounds. This was about 1000 or 1100. I think the M-16 that was with the NVA was SGT Carkin's."

1130 (AAR) The sweep of the area was completed.

Once battalion determined that the enemy was no longer an immediate threat, it turned its attention to recovery, re-supply, and dealing with requests for information from brigade and division, as well as handling all the visitors who wanted to come and see things firsthand.

With the battle concluded and the immediate area free of any possibility of the enemy employing heavy machine guns against any more helicopters, battalion called for its attached direct support artillery, Bravo Battery, 4/42 Artillery, to be brought in from the 2/8 FSB. It had been temporally deposited there the day before when the battalion abandoned FSB 10B during the height of the battle. From mid-morning on, the Chinooks brought in the guns and sling-loads of ammunition and equipment, along with all the other re-supplies the battalion had requested. The air space around FSB 501N was very congested with all the aircraft coming and going.


Early morning sweeps by all three companies revealed enemy losses of 113 KIAs and four prisoners of war. It was estimated the attacking enemy force suffered an additional 200 wounded.

1145 (DSJ) SITREP 1/12 found four armed US M1A1 mines. The battalion's attached engineers were able to disarm the mines without incident.

1200 (DSJ) Brigade dispatched a POW interrogation team to the 1/12's location.

Roger Seip, who wrote an unpublished manuscript about the battalion's history in February 1969, included information learned from the POW interrogations. According to Seip, the enemy's mission had been to overrun the LZ and Charlie Company's defensive position. The enemy force had made their initial movement into their attack positions

The Morning After: Recovery 16 February



As soon as the sweeps on the morning of the 16th February revealed that the enemy had withdrawn from the battlefield, recovery operations were begun in earnest. Searching through the air and artillery impact areas and the ground around the perimeter, 113 NVA bodies were recovered and moved to a suitable site south of the perimeter for disposal. Both downed helicopters were lifted out; four NVA POWs were medically treated and interrogated; and captured enemy equipment was collected, inventoried, and evacuated. Resupply efforts included sling-loads of ammunition, food, and water, as well as the insertion of Bravo Battery, 4/42 Artillery. By the evening of the 16th, LZ 501N had become a fire support base and was bursting at the seams with men and equipment.

under the cover of darkness. The attack was scheduled to begin with a 15 minute mortar barrage. Fortunately for Charlie Company, this plan was disrupted when the two squads conducting early morning sweeps found the NVA still assembling in their attack positions. The loss of the element of surprise, the quick reaction of Charlie Company, and the addition of the remainder of the battalion changed the outcome of the enemy's attack plans.

CPT Northrop: "The clean-up of the battlefield began in earnest as soon as it was safe to do so. Of significant concern were all the enemy bodies and equipment lying about. At some point on the evening of the 15th, a request had gone to brigade for a flamethrower and fuel. I don't think we got the flamethrower, but we did get some fuel. Because there were so many enemy bodies (between 100 and 150), something had to be done. Obviously we couldn't leave them lying about, and since we didn't have a bulldozer, there was no way we could dig a large pit to bury them. Our only choice was to collect them, pile them up, and burn them. I don't know who made the decision to burn them, but I suspect it was battalion. There were already the smells from the smoke of all the other fires, but this was different. Once the burning of the bodies began, the smell was awful, and unforgettable."

SP4 Witt: "When the battlefield was being cleaned up after the battle, all the NVA bodies were piled up in a small ravine outside the perimeter to the southwest and burned. I remember seeing the pile, but did not care to watch the fire. One memory I have of the event is that one of the guys from 2nd Platoon insisted on being the one who would light the fire. I was told he really seemed to enjoy his job that day. I did take one picture of that event. It's the picture with a chopper on the right, a couple of GIs carrying a body, and the smoke of the pyre in the background. I never went down there after it was over to see the aftermath. I didn't care to have those kinds of memories stay with me the rest of my life, if I could help it. Being in the command group kept me from having to participate in the body cleanup details, which was one activity I'm very, very grateful I didn't have to do."


PFC Hedin: "SGT Panak asked me to help with the enemy body burning detail. We talked about me being a kid from northern Minnesota, who had hunted and fished, and that I was someone who could do this. I told him 'OK' because I knew it was something that had to be done. We took ropes and tied them to the legs or some other body parts and dragged the bodies over to where other guys were tossing them into the burn pile. Even though the detail didn't last very long, I still remember the smell of fuel oil and burning flesh."

1325 (DSJ) SITREP A/1/12 received sniper fire from YA598547.

1337 (DSJ) B/4/42 closed 1/12 FSB at 1325.

PFC McMillion: "During the afternoon, we were again sent out to sweep the area. This time we went up a wash that ran along the east side of the perimeter. We found two wounded NVA hiding under the roots of a washed-out tree along the bank. One was a sergeant major, and the other was an officer. SGT Hansen from the weapons platoon carried one of them out. As they were passing by, I saw the NVA slowly sliding his hand down towards Hansen's pistol. I was about to say something when someone else beat me

Dealing with the Dead Enemy Soldiers 16 February



Photograph courtesy of Dennis Witt. A collection detail carries an NVA body past a UH-IB helicopter parked on the LZ landing pad to the burning area just over the ridge and south of the perimeter. The faint smoke rising from behind the ridge line is coming from the funeral pyre. A total of 113 NVA dead were burned here this day.

to it. The NVA's wounded leg was suddenly banged hard against a tree, and the NVA pulled his arm up high and kept it there."

CPT Northrop: "The battalion captured four POWs: one officer, one NCO, and two enlisted men. Between intelligence reports and the POWs, we learned that the enemy's intent had been the destruction and demoralization of an American military unit. In contrast, one of the wounded enemy POWs captured that morning revealed during interrogation that only 18 men from his 300 man battalion were still alive."

The list of enemy equipment that was recovered during the sweeps was quiet extensive and included: 30 AK-47 rifles and 51 AK-47 rifle magazines, six SKS rifles, six RPD light machine guns and 12 RPD light machine gun ammunition drums, one 51 caliber machine gun, eight B-40 rocket launchers and three B-40 rocket launcher rounds, four U.S. M1A1 anti-tank mines, 35 Chicom grenades, 23 entrenching tools, 24 canteens, 11 mess kits, 29 ponchos, 20 hammocks, four mosquito nets, three sweat shirts, 27 sets of web gear, and miscellaneous amounts of food, medicine and other equipment.

Among many on the list of visitors that day was the Division Commander. As was the practice, visiting dignitaries were escorted by someone who could guide them where they should be taken and would make sure they got the right answers to their questions. Not just anyone could be an escort.

CPT Northrop: "After the battle, I was told that Major General Collins, who was being escorted by 1SG Pereda around the perimeter, stopped at the bunker that the 1SG had marked with the 2/8 commander's name and asked about the sign. Since I was not with them, I have no idea what the 1SG told him."

The remainder of the afternoon was quiet and without incident; thus ended the battle at LZ 501N. Like all previous engagements and those to follow, there was no victory fanfare for the battalion. It was business as usual: take care of the dead and wounded, write the afteraction reports, recommend individuals for awards and citations, and find more replacements.

Plans were made for the companies to disperse on the battalion's search-and-destroy mission. Both Bravo and Alpha Companies were scheduled to depart early the next morning, leaving Charlie Company to continue with their fire base security detail.

17 February (Friday)

Enemy activities on the 17th indicated that the NVA had not given up on their efforts to inflict harm to the battalion. At approximately 2255, the battalion received about 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. As all the rounds landed outside the perimeter; there were no friendly casualties. This had not been true earlier in the evening. While adjusting their nightly DCs around their company patrol base, a friendly-fire short round killed PFC John Volner of Bravo Company.


PFC McMillion recalls some of the details leading to PFC Volner's death: "The next day,

Treating Wounded POWs 16 February



Photograph courtesy Dennis Witt. Two Charlie Company medics treat a wounded NVA POW on a stretcher on the morning of the 16th. A second wounded POW can be partially seen lying on the ground in the lower left corner of the photograph. A total of four NVA soldiers were captured during the sweeps conducted on the 16th, all wounded that had been left behind as the enemy withdrew from the battlefield. One of POWs was an officer and another was an NCO.

Looking at Captured Enemy Weapons 16 February



Photograph courtesy Melvin Faber. SP4 Melvin Faber, Bravo Company weapons platoon, looks at an enemy RPD light machine gun, while another man handles an SKS rifle. The weapons were part of the enemy equipment recovered on the 16th of February after the battle. The weapons displayed on the ground are about half of the 51 individual and crew-served enemy weapons picked up that morning. The total equipment recovered included four U.S. M1A1anti-tank mines, which had to be disarmed by the engineers.

the 17th, Bravo Company moved southwest to the top of Hill 346 and dug in for the night. Shortly after dark, the LPs on the southwest side of the perimeter began calling in movement. I could even hear it myself from my position on the same side of the perimeter. The artillery FO started calling in fire and adjusted it to the area where the sounds were coming from. The first 'spotter' rounds were coming right over the hill we were on and falling onto the low ground to the southwest. The LP's came back inside of the perimeter as the FO gave his final adjustment. This final adjustment, as I recall, was: 'Drop 200. fire for effect.' The rounds landed inside our perimeter. Three people were wounded and PFC John Volner was killed. The company CP was directly behind my position. CPT Scherer received minor shrapnel wounds to his back and left shoulder. We eventually determined that the movement had been a bunch of monkeys moving through the area. The entire 105mm battery was firing in support when Volner was killed, not just one gun. It was a 'fire for effect,' which would have been at least three guns. I could hear and counted five or six reports from the guns firing before the shells landed. This means that a three-gun battery would have fired two rounds each for a total of six rounds. All the rounds landed behind my position."


CPT Scherer: "Bravo Company was positioned on Hill 346 on the evening of the 17th when the artillery FO adjusted a fire mission in response to reported movement from two of our LPs. An adjustment was made from one of our previously registered DEFCONs. That adjustment was confirmed to be on target by our LPs and a subsequent 'fire for effect' was called. Because we were in close proximity to the gun-target line, the artillery rounds were passing over our position. When the final correction was made for the mission, the height of the trees that covered the hill we occupied was not taken into consideration. Consequently, as the rounds passed over our position, several of the rounds hit the treetops, causing tree bursts that showered our positions with fragments. I am not really sure why we did not use the 81mm mortars from the battalion FSB, which would have taken advantage of their higher trajectory. The friendly fire death of PFC Volner was a terrible accident."

Another eyewitness to PFC Volner's death was **SP5 Kohler**, Bravo Company's head medic. SP5 Kohler remembers: "Regarding the death of John Volner, Rick Brady has firsthand information about this incident. I was there, but didn't overhear anything about the fire mission. We were on Hill 346. One or more of our LP's heard movement after dark. 1SG Jimmy Jones told the artillery FO to call in the 105's. After calling in at least one round, the FO made a radical correction, which apparently put us on the gun-target line. Then the FO called the 105's to fire for effect. One or more of the five rounds fell within our perimeter. It sounded like the roof was falling in on us. Volner had a big hole in his back, and he died as John Keith and I were getting out our bandages. SSG Tingler was wounded, and was evacuated by night. Cliff Shaver and Fred Case got a small LZ cleared. Fred Case stood in the open with two flashlights and guided the helicopter to the LZ, one of the greatest acts of physical courage I have ever seen."

18 February (Saturday)

The Stars & Stripes ran a story about the battalion and its fight for LZ 501N. They reported that a bitter clash with elements of the North Vietnamese Army had occurred southwest

A View of the 501N After the Battle 17 February



Photograph courtesy Ed Northrop. A picture of LZ/Fire Support Base 501N taken on 17 February by Captain Ed Northrop, the Charlie Company commander. The view is from outside the perimeter as the NVA would have seen the LZ on the 15th during their attack.

of Kontum City on Wednesday, the 15th of February. The story indicated that the fighting broke out shortly after daylight as a multi-battalion force poured into the area as part of Operation Sam Houston. An unidentified company [C-1/12] was setting up an FSB when enemy mortar and small arms fire fell on them. Fighting continued throughout the day. Friendly casualties included the loss of two helicopters and one KIA. Enemy losses were reported at 74 KIAs. A follow-up story in *Stars & Stripes* on Sunday, the 19th, upgraded the enemy losses to 128, and reported that the NVA prisoners of war taken included a lieutenant and a senior NCO.

As a final episode to the battle at 501N, the battalion's recon platoon, while patrolling south of the FSB on the 18th, located and destroyed three enemy mortar positions. They also found one enemy WIA, 15 bunkers, and numerous blood trails from the firefight on the 15th. Regarding the capture of the NVA, **PFC Rene Quiroz**, who was a member of the recon platoon then, tells the following story about the capture: "I saw him first. He was wounded and sitting down. (I didn't know it at the time, but he was sitting on top of a grenade!) I approached him with my weapon ready to fire if he made any funny moves. When he saw me, he hesitated and then decided to raise his hands to his head. I was so relieved that I didn't have to shoot him face-to-face. After we took him, he was very grateful we did not kill him. We turned him over to battalion, who had him evacuated for treatment and interrogation. I have always wondered what happened to him. In retrospect I guess I took a big chance because I think that's how Kaneko got it - - trying to bring in a wounded prisoner."

The battalion continued its patrolling around LZ 501N until the 8th of March, when it finally packed up and moved on looking for the next meeting place and time with the enemy.

Postscript

Battalion losses for the battle at 501N include 32 WIAs and 13 KIAs. Headquarters & Headquarters Company killed in action were: PFC Van Dyke Manners and PFC Eric Speak. Members of Bravo Company who were killed in action were: SGT Harvey Carkin, SP4 Johnie Daniels, SP4 Ronald Gehler, PFC Wayne Card, SP4 Michael Reilly, and PFC John Volner. Known Bravo Company wounded include: PFC Herbert Armstrong, SGT Lonnie Barnes, PFC Alex Boyd, SP4 Mike Datish, LT Leonard Davis, SSG James Hafford, PFC Sherman Swim, and SGT Johnny West.

The Charlie Company efforts and losses are recounted by the company commander CPT Northrop: "To adequately describe the efforts of my men, officers, NCOs, and grunts, is most difficult. To say they did their jobs is not quite adequate, but that is what they did. It is not so much what they did, but rather how they did it. They fought with an amazing courage and strength. The Air Force was SUPERB! The pilots flew in by helicopter a week later to visit with us on the ground. Some of them had flown five or six sorties for us that day. The artillerymen, well, they did their jobs too, and my men and I have our lives to show for it. I have no idea how many rounds were fired, but the taxpayers spent a lot of money at 501N.

"My final comments are for those men who were wounded and for those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Unfortunately, the names and number of wounded were not recorded. I do know that LTs Bill Crews, Everett Glick, and Ben Bulgarin were all wounded, as was SGT Henry Dziekon, PFC Daniel Marshall, SP4 Onegia McKinnie, and PFC John Sims. I know there were many others, but their names escape me after 40 years.

"Our distinguished honor roll of those who made the ultimate sacrifice includes: Sergeant First Class (SFC) Richard Carver, SP4 James Kramer, SSG John Raymond, PFC Louis Willett, and SSG William Wessells."

Louis Willett was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously by President Lyndon B. Johnson on the 5th of September, 1968, for an "Unselfish Act of Bravery." Louis Willett's citation, written by LT David Dresia, provides a clear picture of the intense savage fighting that took place that day. It reads in part "... His squad was conducting a security sweep when it made contact with a larger enemy force. The squad was immediately engaged with a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and pinned to the ground. Despite the deadly fusillade, Private First Class Willett rose to his feet firing rapid bursts from his weapon and moved to a position from which he placed highly effective fire on the enemy. His action allowed the remainder of his squad to begin to withdraw from the superior enemy force toward the company perimeter. Private First Class Willett covered the squad's withdrawal, but his position drew heavy enemy machine gun fire, and he received multiple wounds enabling the enemy again to pin down the remainder of the squad. Private First Class Willett struggled to an upright position, and disregarding his painful wounds, he again engaged the enemy with his rifle to allow his squad to continue its movement and to evacuate several of his comrades who were by now wounded. Moving from position to position, he engaged the enemy at close range until he was mortally wounded "

CPT Northrop: "As many as 80 awards were eventually given out after the battle, but I have always felt there should have been more: 50 Silver Stars, 50 Distinguished Service Crosses, and five Medals of Honor, all of which would have been more than deserved.

"After the battle, replacements were slow coming in. The only officers I had for awhile were LT Swan in the Weapons Platoon and LT Dresia as the Executive Officer. The line platoons were run by NCOs. Eventually, LTs Crews and Bulgarin returned. When my six months in command were up, CPT Green arrived. Our change of command ceremony was very simple. I cried, and he took over."

PART V APPENDICES

APPENDIX A CHAIN OF COMMAND

1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY CHAIN OF COMMAND

10-17 February 1967

Battalion Commander (12 Feb) Battalion Commander (13 Feb) **Battalion Executive Officer**

Battalion S-1 Battalion S-2 Battalion S-3

Battalion Assistant S-3

Battalion S-3 Air Battalion S-4 **Battalion Surgeon Battalion Chaplain**

Battalion Sergeant Major

HHC Commander Recon Platoon Leader 4.2 Mortar Platoon Leader B Battery 4/42 Artillery Air Force Liaison Officer

Alpha Company Commander

Executive Officer First Platoon Leader Second Platoon Leader Third Platoon Leader Weapons Platoon Leader

Bravo Company Commander **Executive Officer** First Platoon Leader Second Platoon Leader Third Platoon Leader

Weapons Platoon Leader

Charlie Company Commander **Executive Officer** First Platoon Leader Second Platoon Leader Third Platoon Leader Weapons Platoon Leader

Lieutenant Colonel James Lay Lieutenant Colonel George Wilcox Major Barney Neal Captain James Bigelow

Captain Brenden Quann Captain Jerry White

Captain Douglas Bennett Captain Melvin Deutsch

Captain Louis Sylvester Lieutenant Edwin Williams

Captain Robert Taggs

Captain Edward Scherer Lieutenant James Laux Lieutenant Edwin Ackerman Lieutenant Leonard Davis Staff Sergeant Clifford Shaver Lieutenant Robert Pearson

Captain Edward Northrop Lieutenant David Dresia Lieutenant Bill Crews Lieutenant Everett Glick Lieutenant Ben Bulgarin Lieutenant Timothy Swan

APPENDIX B MOS CODES

Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) Codes

ENLISTED

00Z - Command Sergeant Major

05B - Radio Operator

05C - Radio Teletype Operator

11B - Infantryman

11C - Indirect Fire Infantryman (Mortars)

11D - Armored Reconnaissance Specialist (Scout)

11E - Armored Crewman (Tanker)

11F - Infantry Operations & Intelligence Specialist

11G - Infantry Senior Sergeant

11H - Infantry Direct Fire Crewman (Recoilless Rifle)

12A - Pioneer (Combat Engineer)

13A - Field Artillery Crewman

16H - Air Defense Artillery Operations/Intelligence Assistant

31B - Field Communications Electronics Equipment Mechanic

31G - Tactical Communications Chief

35K- General Cryptographic Repairman

36A - Wireman

36K- Tactical Wire Operations Specialist

62B - Construction Equipment Repairer

63B - Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic

63C - General Vehicle Repairman

63H - Track Vehicle Repairer

64A - Light Vehicle Driver

71A - Clerk

71B - Clerk Typist

71H - Personnel Specialist

76A - Supply Man

76S - Vehicle Material Supply Specialist

76Y - Unit Supply Specialist

91A - Medical Corpsman

91B - Medical NCO

91C - Practical Nurse

92B - Medical Laboratory Specialist

94B - Food Service Specialist

OFFICER

1193 - Field Artillery Unit Commander

1542 - Infantry Unit Leader

1331 - Combat Engineer Unit Commander

2162 - Operations & Training Staff Officer (S3)

2163 - Air Operations Officer (S3)

2260 - Personnel Staff Officer (S1)

3100 - General Medical Officer

3506 - Field Medical Assistant

4010 - Supply Staff Officer (S4)

4803 - Maintenance Officer

5310 - Chaplain

8105 - Civil Affairs Officer (S5)

9301 - Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer (S2)

APPENDIX C PERSONNEL ROSTERS



1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT "RED WARRIORS" HHC APO SF 96262 PERSONNEL ROSTER JULY 1966-DECEMBER 1966 MTOE: 7-18E (WAKFTOA) (25 February 2006 - 152 names)



Rank	Last name	First name	PLT	Position	MOS	ASSIGN	DEROS	WIA	COMMENT/SOURCE
SP4	Adelson	Sam	Medical	B Co	91B20	1966	1967		
PFC	Allen	Jay H.R.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967		CIB
2LT	Amick	Marvin M.	НО		1542	1966	1967		CIB
PV2	Anderson	Billy, D.	Medical		91B10	99-20			
CW3	Bahr		Support	PBO	1966	1967			
SP4	Barnett	Rickey D.	Medical	A Co	91B20	99-20	1967	4	
PFC	Beach	Willard A. III	Recon	2 nd	11B10	1966	1967		CIB
PFC	Beggs	Edmon D.	Recon	Znd	11B10	1966	1967		CIB
SGT	Bejarano	Rudy T.	Mortars		11C40	1966	1967		CIB
PFC	Best	Larry L.	Medical	A Co	94B20	99-20	29-20		
1LT	Bennett	Douglas, P.	НО	Asst S-3	1542	99-70			AMs
SP4	Blaney	Robert C.	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB
SGT	Bodero		Radar	1	11F40	1966	1967		
PFC	Bowman	James E.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967	09/21/66	"Jim" CIB
SSG	Brazzins		Recon	3 rd	11H40	99-20	29-20		"Buzz"
SFC	Breaux	James	НО	S2/S3	11B40	1966	1967	11/12/66	CIB

ш	Bruell	Eberhard	Recon	3 rd	11B40	1966	1967	03/14/67	PH, CIB
ш	Butlin	Joe	Radar		11F20	1966	1967		
U	Campbell	Bobby L.	Medical	A Co	91B20	07-66	29-20		CMB
0	Chambers	Robert A.	Medical	C Co	91B20	07-66	19-70	09/21/66	
0	Ciolek	Robert M.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967	09/25/66	CIB
	Clark	Delwyne H.	НО	ox	1542	1966	1967		
	Clark	Edward L.	Medical	MO	3100	99-20			CMB
	Compton		Radar		11F10	1966	1967		
	Cooper	James A.			11B40	1966	1967		CIB
	Courtney	Allan	Medical	C Co	91B20	07-66		11/12/66	
	Curry		Medical		92B20	1966	1967		
_	Dandurand	Vincent				99-20			
	Daos	Tosh	Radar		11F40	1966	1967		
-	Darr	Darwin G.	Medical		91C20	99-20			CMB
-	De La Rosa	Louis	Medical	3/A Co	91B20	99-20	07-67		CMB, BS
-	Delo	Milton L.	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB
	Depeal	Joseph A.	Medical	3/B Co	91B20	99-20			CMB, SS
-	De Roche	Raymond A.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967	09/25/66	CIB
	Deutsch	Melvin	Medical	MO	3100	01-67	29-60		BSv, ACM
-	Doane	Delberta	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB
	Doscinski	Leonard	Recon	НФ		99-20	19-20		
	Downs	Michael C.	HQ	S-2	1542	99-20	29-20		BS, AMs, CIB

-	- 1	-	T	- 1	- 1	Т	1			- 1	5	1									
AMs, PH	ACMv, PH	KIA 5-30-67	CIB		AMs; CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	CMB	CIB		CIB			CIB	CIB (RTO)			CMB	CIB
WIA	WIA																				
	12-67		1967	1967		1967	1967	1967	1967		1967	1967	1967	01-67	03-67	1967	29-90	1967	1967		1967
99-20	12-66	99-20	1966	1966	07-66	1966	1966	1966	1966	07-66	1966	1966	1966	99-20	99-60	1966	99-20	1966	1966	99-20	1966
1542	11H20	11B20	11C10	11F20	1542	11C10	11H10	11D20	11H10	91B20	11H10	11F40	11H10	3100		11H10	11H20			91B20	11B10
S-1	3 rd	1st			S-3		3 rd	181	3 rd		3 rd		3 rd	MO		3 rd	НФ				2 nd
Я	Recon	Recon	Mortars	Radar	НО	Mortars	Recon	Recon	Recon	Medical	Recon	Radar	Recon	Medical	Recon	Recon	Recon		Recon	Medical	Recon
Eugene W.	Lonnie	Alfred	John P.	Leonard	Paul, E.	Anthony R.	Demetrius	Michael J.	Joseph A.	Frederick	Paul E.		David J.	Jeffery		Donald M.	Don R.	Henry C.		Melvin D.	Miller
Echols	Edwards	Ellis	Faust	Fowler	Freeman	Garskie	Georgalas	Grabowski	Greico	Griffith	Grother	Haines	Halter	Hare	Harris	Hartman	Harvey	Heady	Hickerson	Hickman	Higginbotham
11LT	SP4	SP4	PFC	SP4	CPT	PFC	PFC	SP4	PFC	PFC	PFC	SGT	PFC	CPT	PFC	PFC	SP4	PFC	PFC	PFC	PFC

H	Roger A.	Recon	1 st	11D40	99-60	29-60		BSs
Houseman	Carl	Radar		11F10	1966	1967		
Hughes	James	Radar		11F20	1966	1967		
Hunt	Jim C.	Radar		11F20	99-80	29-90		
Hunter	Samuel C.	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB
Hurley	James B.	Medical	A/S	91C20	07-66			СМВ
Hyde	Robert L.	Medical		91A10	99-20			KIA 09-21-66
Jaffe	Joseph A.	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB
Jameson		Radar		11F10	1966	1967		
Jenkins	Vernell	Medical		91B20	99-20			KIA 09-21-66
Johnson	Robert L.	Mortars		11C40	1966	1967		CIB
Kaneko	Julio	Recon	2 nd	11H40	07-66	-		KIA 03-17-67; CIB; SS
Kaufman		Medical	A Co	91B10	1966	1967		
Kearney	Dennis D.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967		CIB
Keely	John, G.				07-66			
Keith	Delbert	Medical	C Co	92B30	99-80	1967		
Kelly	John M.	Medical		91B20	99-20			CMB
Kennedy	Bob	Radar		11F20	1966	1967		
Koch	David N.	Medical		91B20	99-20			CMB
Kocinski		Recon	НО	1542	99-20	99-80	99/80	
Kocon	Thomas J.	Mortars		11C10	1966	1967		CIB
Kohler	Harrison W.	Medical	B Co	91B20	99-80	29-90		CMB, ACM

	AMs	CMB			ACMs	CIB; PH; ACM	BS		PH; CIB		СМВ		CIB	CIB				CIB	CIB	PH; CIB	
	Q.	O			1	WIA			WIA											WIA	
1967			1967	1967	29-20	29-90	1967	1967	29-20	29-20			1967	1967	07-67		29-90		1967	19-20	
1966	99-20	99-20	99-20	1966	01-66	99-20	1966	1966	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	1966	1966	99-20	1966	99-90	99-90	1966	99-20	
11F20	11B50	91B20	91B20		11F20	11B20			11B40	94B40	91B20	91B20	11F50	11F50	91B20			1542	11H10	11D40	2
	BNCSM					2 nd			2 nd	A Co		C Co	S2/S3	S2/S3	A Co				3 rd	НО	
Radar	НО	Medical	Medical		НО	Recon		Recon	Recon	Medical	Medical	Medical	НО	НО	Medical		Сотто	НО	Recon	Recon	
Ray	Leroy, G.	Melvin C.	Phil		Roy, R.	Rene M.	Peter J. Jr		Rodney J.	Herbert W.	David P.	George	Edward J.	Walter	Louis	Waitman M.	Neal A.	Edward V.	Bernd J.	John H.	
Parsons	Patrick	Patrick	Patrick	Petrocelli	Piljuga	Quiroz	Raineri	Rascon	Ray	Ree	Richardson	Richardson	Riley	Russell	De La Rosa	Sandy	Sanford	Scherer	Sedlacek	Shaffer	
SP4	SGM	PFC	SP6	SP4	SP5	SP4	SP4	PFC	SGT	SSG	PFC	SP4	MSG	MSG	PFC	SP5	SGT	1LT	PFC	SFC	

т	-		1			- 1	T					1			-1				- 1	T	
CMB	KIA 2-15-67		CIB	CIB		CIB	CMB							CMB	CIB	CIB	BSs	CIB, BS	CIB	Deceased	(1,4) SS
			1967	1967	1967		29-20	79-70	1967	1967	1967		29-90		1967	1967	04-67	29-90	1967		04-67
99-20	1967	99-20	1966	1966	1966	99-20	99-20	99-20	1966	1966	1966	99-20	99-90	99-20	1966	1966	07-66	12-66	1966	07-66	03-67
91B20	11C10		11D40	11D10	91A10	1542	91B20	94B20	11B40	11F20	11F10	92B30		91B20	11C10	11B20		1542	11C10	91B20	1542
			1st	1st	B Co	S-4	A Co	A Co								2 nd	Chaplin	НФ		Recon	BN CDR
Medical	Mortars		Recon	Recon	Medical	НО	Medical	Medical	НФ	Radar	Radar	Medical	Commo	Medical	Mortars	Recon	НО	Recon	Mortars	Medical	НО
Spencer A.	Eric B.		Jack R.	Harold L.	John	Louis, A.	Felix E.	William		Richard		Sandy, M.	Earl R.	Francis E.	Gerald R.	Ronald C. Jr	Max W.	Edwin A. III	Ernest L.	Earl	Grady, W.
Simco	Speak	Stewart	Stinnett	Stippich	Stroud	Sylvester	Szaldowski	Terrell	Tolbert	Trowbridge	Vinke	Waitman	Weltch	Wesley	White	Whiteman	Wilk	Williams	Williams	Williams	Williams
PFC	PFC	SP4	SSG	PFC	PFC	1LT	SP4	PFC	18G	SP4	PFC	SP5	SGT	√SP5	PFC	SP4	√CPT	√1LT	PFC	SP4	MAJ

1
ထု
a
ŏ
a
n .

1LT	Willis	Frank, D.	Mortars	Z Z	1542	99/8	10/0	09/21/00	CIB; PH
PFC	Wilson	Gene	Medical	C Co	91A10	11-66	11-67		
√1LT	Wise	Franklin F.	Support	PLT LDR	1542	99-90	29-90	11/66	BSv, BSs, PH, CIB
SP4	Wood	Richard A.	Mess		94B20	99-90	06-67		
SP4	Wood	Roy K.	Medical	A Co	94B20	99-20	07-67		
SP4	Workman	Randy C.	Medical		91B20	99-20			CMB
PFC	Muller	Terry L.	Recon	2 nd	11B10	1966	1967		CIB
SP4	Zeiss	Herbert J.	Mortars		11C20	1966	1967		CIB



1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT "RED WARRIORS" A COMPANY APO SF 96262 PERSONNEL ROSTER JULY 1966-DECEMBER 1966 MTOE: 7-18E (WAKFAOA) (21 February 2006 - 162 names)



Rank	Last Name	First Name	PLT	SQD	Position	Assign	DEROS	WIA	Comments/Source
SP4	Adams	George K.			11B20	99-20	29-20		ACMv
SSG	Akerley	William T. Jr.	1st		11B40	99-20	29-20	10/27/66	SS, PH
PFC	Albertson	James H.			11B10	99-20	29-20		
PFC	Alexander	Charlie M.	3 rd		11B10	99-80	08-67	10/27/66 12/02/66	H
SGT	Almeda	Carlos L.	1st		11B40	99-20	29-20		
SP4	Anderson	Karl J.			11B20	99-20	29-20		
PFC	Angerman	Robert F.	4 th	1	11C10	99-20	29-20		
SP4	Armstrong	David T.			11B20	99-20	29-20	09/26/66	
SP4	Ashworth	John S.	4th		11C20	99-20	19-10	11/12/66	ЬН
PVT	Askew	McKinley Jr.			11B10	99-70	29-20		
SGT	Ayuso	Carlos M.	HQ	НО	31G40	99-20	29-20		
SP4	Baco	George	1st		11B20	99-80	29-80		BS, ACMv
PFC	Baden	Arthur G.			11B10	99-20	29-20		
PFC	Baily	James H.			11B10	07-66	29-20		"Jim"
SP4	Bahrijczuk	George R.	4 th		11C20	99-20	19-10		
SP4	Baldus	Cabezas O.			11B20	99-20	29-20		

SP4	Barbusa	Martin	2 nd	3 rd	11B20	99-20	1967	12/02/66		
PFC	Barnard	Joseph G.			11B10	99-20	1967			
PFC	Barnes	Ronald			11B10	99-20	19-70			
PFC	Barrera	Jose A III	4 th		11C10	99-20	19-70			
SP4	Batchelder	David R.	4 th		11C20	99-80	19-80			
SSG	Bautista	Robert A.	НФ	HQ	76K40	99-20	02-67			
SP4	Bavuso	Martin T.			11B20	99-20	19-20			
PSG	Bennett	Glenn S.		рн	11B4H	99-20	07-67			
PFC	Berg	Michael	1st	эε	11B10	1966	1967		owes \$15	
√SP4	Bernard	Joe G.	1st	1st	11B20	99-20	07-67		BSs, CIB	
PFC	Bolton	George M. III			11B10	99-20	19-20			
PFC	Bowens	Thomas A.			11B10	99-20	29-20			
PFC	Bowman	James E.	4th		11C10	99-20	1967			
SP4	Brazeel	Raymond L.			11B20	99-20	19-20			
SP4	Brown	James T.	3 rd		11B20	99-80	19-80	12/02/66	ЬН	
SSG	Brown	John E.			11B40	02-66	07-67	11/12/66	ЬН	
SP4	Burg	Michael A.			11B20	99-20	07-67		"Mike"	
SP4	Busby	Michael F.			11B20	99-20	03-67	03/67	PH "Mike"	
SGT	Butler	Stanley J.	1st		11B40	99-20	07-67			
171	Byerly	Paul J.	HQ	xo	1542	99-20	29-20			
SP4	Caldwell	Charles E.	2 nd	3 rd	11B20	99-60	19-60		CIB	
DEC	Carter	Jesse L.	3 rd	2 nd	11B10	99-20	19-20		ACMv (RTO)	

-

	Edmonds	George			11B40	99-20	29-20	12/02/66	BS
	Ekwall	Jerry W.			11B20	99-20	19-10		
	Emery	Everet E.			11B20	99-20	19-70		
12.5	Enari	Mark N.	3 rd	НФ	1542	99-20			KIA 12-2-66, SS
	Ferrar	Mark H.			11B10	99-20	07-67		
	Geldersma	Russell D.	4 th		11C10	99-20	29-20		
	Gentile	Anthony J.	3 rd	2 nd	11B20	99-20	29-20		
7	Gerads	Lyle J.	4 th		11C20	99-20	29-20		
100	Gipson	Arthur	2 nd	НО	1542	99-20	07-67		
	Goff	John E.	2 nd		11B20	07-66	1967		
25.50	Gonzalez	Lopez N.			11B10	99-60	19-60		
- 50	Green	Ernest			11B20	99-20			KIA 12-13-66
	Grives	Wayne E.	44		11C40	99-20	07-67		
	Groleau	Verney F.			11B40	99-20	07-67		
	Grouch	Robert E.	ğ	186	11G50	99-20	07-67		
	Harris	Larry G.	4 th		11H10	99-20	29-20		
	Heider	Dennis W.	4 th		11H10	99-20	07-67		
	Herron	Yenson L.	1st		11B20	99-20	1967		"Buck" BS, ACMv
SSG-P	Hewitt	Stanley M.	1 st		11B40	99-90	29-90		
PFC	量	Rayfal B.			11B10	99-20	29-20		
	Hixon	David L.			11B10	99-20	19-70		
SSG	Holtz	Moses B.			11B40	99-20	19-20		

vcevich Bartul 4th 11B10 Jarvis Darryl L. 4th 11B10 Johannsen Paul E. 11B40 Jones George G. 11B10 Jones Randolph F. HQ 11B10 Keeler Ralph L. 11B10 Keelar Michael W. 11B10 Kitchens Richard E 1st 11B10 Kitchens Ronald E. 3rd 2rd 11B10 La Valle David J. 11B10 11B10 Lavigne Albert J. 4th 11C10				1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
Sen Darryl L. 4 th 4 th 4 th Sen George G. HQ 10 Randolph F. HQ 10 10 Thomas 2 nd 2 nd 10 Ralph L. Ralph L. 1st 1st 1st Richard E. 3 nd 2 nd 1st 1st 1st Bavid J. Bavid J. 4 th 1st 1		11B10	99-20	29-20		
sen Paul E. Accorde G. HQ Randolph F. HQ Accorder G. HQ Thomas 2 nd Accorder G. Accord	4th	11C10	99-80	79-80		
George G. HQ Randolph F. HQ Thomas 2 nd Ralph L. N Nichael W. 1 st Richard E 1 st Ronald E. 3 rd e David J. e Albert J. e Albert J.		11B40	99-20	29-20		
Randolph F. HQ Thomas 2 nd Ralph L. N Michael W. A Richard E 1 st Ronald E. 3 rd e David J. e Albert J. 4 th 4 th		11B10	99-20	29-20		
Thomas 2 nd Ralph L. Albert J. Ralph L. Ath	HQ	11B40	99-20	29-20		
Michael W. Richard E 1 st Ronald E. 3 rd 2 nd e David J. Albert J. 4 th	2 nd	11B10	99-20			KIA 12-02-66, SS
n Michael W. 1st 2nd ns Ronald E. 3nd 2nd le David J. ne Albert J. 4th		11B10	99-20			KIA 09-04-66
Richard E 1 st ns Ronald E. 3 rd 2 nd le David J. 1 1 le Albert J. 4 th 1		11B10	99-20	29-20		
Ronald E. 3 rd 2 nd David J. 4 th	1st	11B10	99-20	29-20		
David J. Albert J. 4 th		11B10	99-20	19-10		"Ron"
Albert J. 4 th		11B10	99-20	19-20		
	4th	11C10	99-80	29-80		
Litfin Donald E. 4 th 11C10	4th	11C10	99-20	19-20		
Little Ronald L. 11B10		11B10	99-20	29-20		
Lopez Francisco 4 th 11C10	4th	11C10	11-66	11-67		
Lopez William S. 4 th 11H10	4 _{th}	11H10	99-80	29-80		
Luna John P. Jr. 4 th 11C10	4th	11C10	99-80	19-80		
Manzanares Bernard 2 nd 3 rd 11B40		11B40	99-20	19-20		BS
Marler Raymond 2 nd 11B4H	2 nd	11B4H	11-66	11-67	12/02/66	
Martin Curtis A. 4 th 11C40	4th	11C40	99-20	07-67		
McGre James E. 11B20		11B20	99-20	19-20		

PFC

PFC

PSG

PFC

SGT

PFC

PVT

PFC

SGT

SSG

SGT

CPL

PFC	Melendez	Ortis A.	Ī		11B10	99-60	29-60		
PFC	Mendoza	Frank S.	НО	НФ	36K10	99-20	19-70		
PFC	Miller	Thomas L.			11B10	11-66	11-67		
PFC	Montevered	Ronald M.			11B10	99-80	08-67		
SSG	Montera	Petronell			11B40	99-20	19-70	09/22/66	
SP5	Moreno-Perez	Roberto	4 th		11C40	99-20	04-67		
SSG	Morris	Roy M.	3 rd	2 nd	11B40	99-20	19-10		SS
SGT	Moss	David G.			11B40	99-20	03-67		
PVT	Moya	Crisoford Jr.			11B10	99-80	19-80		
PFC	Murphy	Riley			11B10	99-80	08-67		
SP4	Mumma	Dennis	3rd		11B20	99-20	1967	12/02/66	
PFC	Nazionale	Louis L. Jr.	НФ	НО	71,120	99-20	04-67		
SGT	Newman	Milton L.	4 th		11H40	99-20	19-10		
SSG	Norris				11B40	99-20	19-10		SS
SP4	Odell	Roger E.	3 rd	3 rd	11B20	99-20	1967		RTO
PFC	Olson	William J.	4 th		11C10	99-20	04-67		
PSG	Oliveras	Montalvo A.	4 th	МО	11C40	99-20	29-20		
PFC	Osborne	Craig A.	H	М	76Y10	99-80	19-80		
PFC	Oyola	Avelino B.			11B10	99-60	29-60		
PSG	Padilla	Marcelo E.		НД	11B40	99-20	19-10		
SP4	Peak	Sammie G.	3rd	3 rd	11B20	99-20	1967	12/02/66	BS
PFC	Price	Ernest A.			11B10	99-60	29-60		

.1
16
0
ğ
Ра

SP4	Toby	Thomas	3 rd	2 nd	11B20	99-20	1967		
PFC	Tutlero		1st	3rd	11B10	1966	1967		
PFC	Walker	Fred	1st	314	11B10	1966	1967		
SP4	Ward	Robert P.	3 rd .	3 rd	11B20	07-66	07-67		
SSG	Warren	Samie L.			11B40	99-20	07-67		
PFC	Weight	Horace F.	1st	2 nd	11B10	99-80	08-67		SS
PV2	Weinberg	Dennis E.			11B10	99-20			KIA 11-24-66
1LT	Weindel	Ronald C.	1st	НФ	1542	99-20	07-67	WIA	BS
PFC	West	James S.			11B10	99-20	07-67		
PFC	Williams	Jim	1st	3 rd	11B10	1966	1967		
PFC	Williams	Joe T.			11B10	99-20	19-20		
SGT	Wimberly	Jeramiah Jr.			11B40	99-20	04-67		
SSG	Wright	Robert F.	3 rd		11B40	99-20	07-67		BS
SP4	Wysocki	Stanley A.	3rd	3 rd	11B20	99-20	1967	12/02/66	



1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT "RED WARRIORS" B COMPANY APO SF 96262 PERSONNEL ROSTER JULY 1966-DECEMBER 1966 MTOF- 7-18F (WAKFROA)

MTOE: 7-18E (WAKFBOA) (17 February 2006 - 167 names)

Rank	Last Name	First Name	PLT	SQD	Position	Assign	DEROS	WIA	Comments/Source
2LT	Ackerman	Edwin A.	3 _{rd}		1542	99-20	1967	09/25/66	Deceased
PFC	Ahlden	Curt L.			11B10	1966	07-67	12/07/67	
SGT	Albin				11B40	1966	1967		
SP4	Alexander	Alvy J.			11B20	1966	07-67	12/07/67	ЬН
SP4	Alexander	James R.			11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Anderson	Ronald L.	4th	1st	11C10	99-20	07-67		CIB "Ron"
PFC	Armstrong	Herbert			11B10	99-20	1967	02/15/67	CIB
SP4	Baldwin	Lonnie A.	314		11B20	1966	03-67		CIB
CPL	Ballagh	Rowan K.	3rd	2 nd	11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Barelli	John	2 nd		11B10	1966	1967	12/02/66	
SGT	Barnes	Lonnie L.			11B40	07-66	1967	02/15/67	CIB
PFC	Bethel	Roy	2 nd		11B10	1966	1967		
PFC	Bertholf	Mark E.			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Blackburn	Elbert F.	2 nd		11B10	99-60	***********		KIA 03-16-67
SP4	Beilfuss	Ronald	4th	2 nd	11C20	1967	1968		"Fuss"
PFC	Bowie	Walker L.			11B10	07-66	1967		CIB
PFC	Boyd	Alex L.			11B10	03-67	1968	02/16/67	CIB

SP4	Brady	Richard T.	HQ	RTO	05820	99-20	19-70	11/66-02/67	PH; "Rick"
SP4	Branson				11B20	1966	12-67		
SP4	Brewster	Ronald L.			11B20	07-66	07-67		
SGT	Brooks	Bonnie			11H40	07-66	1967		CIB
PFC	Bryla	Albert J.	1st		11B10	07-66	1967	02/15/67	CIB, PH
PFC	Butera	Joseph S			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
SP4	Butler	Dave			11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
SP4	Campbell	Donald P.			11B20	99-20	29-90	02/15/67	CIB, PH
SP4	Campos	Lawrence P.	μş		11B20	99-20			KIA 12-02-66; CIB, "Larry"
PFC	Card	Wayne N.	2 nd		11B10	99-60			KIA 02-16-67
SGT	Carkin	Harvey M.	2 nd		11B40	12-66	-		KIA 02-15-67
PFC	Carrion-Dones	Jorge			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
SGT	Carter	James R.			11B40	99-20	07-67		Malaria
PFC	Carty	Thomas A.			11B10	1966	1967	12/07/67	Н
SSG	Case	Fred L.	4th	НО	11C40	99-20	07-67		CIB, SS
1LT	Case	Melvin E.	НО	ох	1542	02-66	1967		CIB "Mel"
SP4	Chambers	George M.			· 11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
SSG	Channell	Richard V.	2 nd		11B40	99-20	1967		CIB
1SG	Childers	Richard	HQ		11B50	99-20	99-60		Deceased
SSG	Clark	George L.			11B40	99-20	1967		CIB
SGT	Clayton	Thudus O.	3rd	1st	11B40	99-20	1967		CIB
SP4	Coleman	Jimmy R.			11B20	99-20	1967	02/03/67	PH, CIB

												-									
	CIB	PH, CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	Supply	CIB	KIA 02-15-67; CIB, BS			CIB	CIB	CIB (worked in supply)	CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	ЬН	CIB	CIB, BS
		02/04/67			11/07/66				02/15/67			02/15/67							09/17/66		
07-67	07-67	1967	1967	1967	1967	07-67	1967	-	1968	1967	1967	1968	1967	19-10	1961	1961	1961	1967	1961	1967	19-10
99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	1967	1966	99-20	1967	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20
11C20	11B10	11B20	11B20	11B10	11B40	11B20	11B20	11B20	11B20	1542	11B10	1542	11B20	11C40	11B10	11B20	11B20	11B10	11B20	11B20	11C40
																ВH					1st
4 th					2 nd	HQ						2 nd	РЮ	4th	2 nd	314		3 rd		314	4th
Walter J.	John D.	Henry W.	Julice D.	Lance N.	Richard D.	Danny R.	Jerome J.	Johnie N.	Mike	Timothy E.	Dan L.	Leonard W.	Carl W.	Thomas R.	John H.	Marvin	Willie J.	Dennis S.	Ruben M.	Shirel L.	Melvin A.
Colec	Coles	Cooper	Cotney	Cox	Cox	Crosby	Czahor	Daniels	Datish	Davenport	Davis	Davis	Day	DeClue	De Martino	Dew	Dixon	Drew	Duran	England	Faber
SP4	SP4	SP4	SP4	PFC	SFC	SP4	SP4	SP4	SP4	2LT	PFC	2LT	SP4	SGT	PFC	SP4	SP4	PFC	SP4	SP4	SGT

CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB	SS	CIB	CIB			CIB	CIB	CIB, PH	CIB, BS	CIB	CIB	РН		CIB	CIB, PH	CIB	
						WIA		WIA			12/07/67				12/07/67	12/07/67	12/02/66	12/07/67		
1967	1967	1967	07-67	1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	19-20	1967	12-67	1968	1967	07-67	1967	07-67	1967	03-67	1967	1967
99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	1966	99-20	99-20	1966	1966	99-20	99-20	12-66	03-67	99-20	99-20	1966	1966	1966	1966	07-66	1966
11B20	11B10	11B20	11C40	11B50	1542	11C10	11B40	11B10	11C40	11B10	11C20	11B10	11B10	1542	11B20	11B10	11B10	11B20	11B20	1542
			1 st			2 nd					2 nd									ox
3 rd	3 rd		4th	НФ	1st	4 th			4 th		4 th			НО	2 nd		1st	4 th		HQ
Richard J.	Ronald A.	Curtis E.	James Jr.	Jimmie	Thomas M.	William A.	George, N.		Joseph M.	Gerald C.	Frank	Travis N.	Daniel E.	James H.	Alberto	Lynn D.	Horace C.	Robert L.	Richard A	Warren
Johnson	Johnson	Jones	Jones	Jones	Jones	Kichman	King	Koop	Krajewski	Kubish	Lackey	Lamkin	Larkins	Laux	Lopez- Rodriquez	Lotze	Lucas	Mackey	Mata	McCluen
SP4	PFC	SP4	SGT	186	2LT	PFC	SGT	PFC	SGT	PFC	SP4	PFC	PFC	1LT	SP4	PFC	PFC	SP4	SP4	1.1

SP4	McMillion	James L.	₽4	2 nd	11C20	12-66	12-67	12/07/67	CIB, PH "Montagnard Mac"
SP4	Mentzer	Gerald L.	1st		11B20	99-20			KIA 08-13-66
SP4	Miller	Clark A.	3 rd		11B20	99-20			KIA 03-16-67; CIB
PFC	Mitchell	Ronald D.			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
SGT	Montgomery	Owen R.	3 rd		11B40	1967			KIA 07-12-67
PFC	Moody	Edward L.	4 th	1st	11C10	1967	1968	16/03/67	CIB, "Ed"
PFC	Morreale	Carl W.	4 th		11C10	99-20	07-67		
PFC	Morin	George J.			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Morreale	Card W.	4th		11C10	07-66	1967		CIB
PFC	Neilson				11B10	1966	12-67		
SP4	Newell	Stanley, A.	3 rd		11B20	99-20	1967	07/12/67	POW 07-12-67
SP4	Nickolson	Samuel	3 rd		11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Niemeyer	Dennis L.			11B10	19-20	1968		
SP4	Norton	Sidney	4₽	3 rd	11C20	1967	1968		BS, "Sid"
√PFC	Page	John E.	4th	1st	11C10	99-20	19-20	03/16/67	PH, CIB, deceased
PFC	Patton	Dennis W.	₽4		11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
SP4	Pealer	Bruce A.			11B20	99-20	1967		BS, ACM-V (RTO)
1LT	Pearson	Robert, F.	4 th	HQ	1542	99-20	04-67		CIB
SSG	Peek	Bobby	HQ		76Y40	1966	1967		Supply Sergeant
√SGT	Philipps	Douglas W.	44₽	2 nd	11C40	07-66	29-90	12/03/67	CIB, BSv
SGT	Polgeeba	Mark J.			11B10	07-66	1967		CIB "Polecat"
SP4	Price	Ralph E.			11B20	99-20	1967		CIB

	T	1	T	T	1	1	-	-		1	1	-1-	-	_	1	1	-	-	_		_
CIB	CIB	CIB	KIA 02-15-67; CIB, SS		CIB	CIB	CIB	CDR RTO	CIB "Aggie"	CIB, BS	CIB	CIB	CIB; "Jerry"	CIB	CIB	CIB	CIB "Cliff"	CIB	PH, CIB	CIB, "Double O"	
														10/29/66					02/03/67		07/12/67
03-67	1967	1967		1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	1967	19-70	1967	1967	1967	05-67	1967	1967	1967	79-70
99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-20	1966	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	1966	99-90	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20
11B40	11840	11B20	11B20	11B10	11B40	11B10	11B10	11B20	11C10	11B40	11B20	11B10	11C40	11B10	11B10	11B40	11B40	11B10	11B20	11B10	11B10
					3 rd								FDC				오				
			2 nd		3 rd			HQ	4 th	1st			4 th			3 rd	3 rd			3rd	
Paul L.	Nu'uelua S.	Horace R.	Michael P.	Ronald A.	Pedro A.	Jerry L.	Samuel O.	Mick	Augustin Jr.	Carlos V.	Neil C.	Richard J.	Jerome W.	George C.	Gerald D.	Foster	Clifford G.	James R.	Andrew A.	James L.	Glenn
Pride	Pu'u	Randolph	Reilly	Rekemeyer	Reyes	Rhodes	Ricketts	Rioux	Rivera	Rivera-Luna	Robinson	Roux	Salavec	Schmitt	Schreiner	Sellers	Shaver	Sikes	Simons	Soule	Stanley
SSG	SGT	SP4	SP4	PFC	SGT	PFC	PFC	SP4	PFC	SSG	SP4	PFC I	SGT	PFC 8	PFC 8	SGT	SSG	PFC 8	SP4	PFC 8	PFC 8

PFC	Stark	Robert J.			11H10	99-20	1967		CIB "Bob"
SGT	Strothers	Cornell	3 rd		11B40	99-20	1967		CIB "Strut"
PFC	Swim	Shermin X.			11B10	99-20	1967	02/15/67	CIB
SP4	Taylor	Terry G.	$3^{\rm rd}$		11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
√SGT	Thiel	Allen R.	1st		11B20	99-60	29-60		
SGT	Thompson	Byron M.	2 nd		11B40	1966	19-70	12/07/67	CIB, PH, SS
SGT	Toth	Lajos, J.	3 rd		11B40	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Tucker	Travis			11B10	1966	1967		
√SP4	Van Bendegom	James, L.			11B20	1966		07/12/67	POW & MIA 07-12-67
PFC	Vivolo	Joseph J.			11B10	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Volner	John D.			11B10	99-60			KIA 02-17-67, DSC
SGT	Waddell	Bobby L.			11B40	99-20			KIA 12-20-66; CIB
SSG	Wallace	Eugene			11B40	99-20	1967		CIB
PFC	Ward	George S.			11B10	1966	1967		
SP4	Washington	Albert L.	2 nd		11B20	99-20	1967		CIB
√SP4	Watson	Kevin, F.	4th	1st	11C20	99-60	29-60		CIB
SGT	West	Johnny	3 rd		11B40	99-20	1967	02/15/67	CIB
PFC	Willard	Fred C.			11B10	1966	1967	10/29/66	
11.	Williams	Edwin A. III	4 th	НО	1542	99-20	12-66		CIB; transferred to HHC



1ST BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT "RED WARRIORS" C COMPANY APO SF 96262 PERSONNEL ROSTER JULY 1966-DECEMBER 1966 MTOE:7-18E (WAKFCOA) (March 18, 2007 - 216 names)



Rank	Last Name	First Name	PLT	SQD	MOS	Assign	DEROS	WIA	Comments/Source
SSG	Abad	Florencio M.	3 rd		11B40	99-90	29-90	11/12/66	BS, ACMv, PH; "Speedy"
SP4	Abbott	Bruce	1st		11B20	99-90	29-90		
SSG	Alejandro-Santos	Roberto	4 th		11C40	99-90	29-90		
PFC	Anderson	Charles T.	2 nd		11B10	99-90		09/21/66	KIA 11/12/66; PH
PV2	Armstrong	Felton	1st		11B10	99-60	29-60		
PFC	Barrett	Reginald			11B10	99-60	29-60		
PFC	Barton	Leon E.	1st		11B10	99-20	29-20	WIA	품
PFC	Bastitas	Jorge V.	314		11B10	99-20	12-66		
SP4	Belknap	Maurice J.	4 th		11C20	1966	1967	07/12/67	Deceased
SP4	Bennett	Robert E.	Н		11B20	99-90	29-90		
SP4	Bettiga	John A. Jr	4 th		11C20	99-90	29-90		CIB
√CPT	Bigelow	James E.	HQ	CDR	1542	99-20	12-67		BSs, AMs, CIB Trans to HHC
PFC	Blackwell	Kenneth H.	2 nd		11B10	99-60		i x	KIA 11-12-66
PFC	Blakely	Thomas C.			11B10	99-90	04-67		
PFC	Bocook	Ronald E.	2 nd		11B10	99-20			KIA 11-12-66
SP4	Boynton	Kenneth C.	2 nd		11B20	99-90	29-90		

						ACMv, PH				KIA 02-15-67; ACMv	ACM		KIA 3-17-67	Н		CIB, ACMV		BS, PH			
	02/15/67					11/12/66	11/12/66		WIA	09/21/66				16/03/67			10/20/66	02/15/67			
29-90	02-67	29-90	29-90	04-67	02/67	04-67	29-90	11-67	29-90		79-90	04-67		03-67	04-67	10-67	04-67	02-67	29-90	04-67	04-67
99-90		99-90	99-90	99-90		99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-60	99-20	99-60	99-20	10-66	99-60		99-90	99-90	99-60
11B20	1542	11B20	11C20	11C10	11B20	11B20	11B20	11B40	11B40	11B40	11B40	11B10	11B20	11B10	11B10	11B10	11B10	1542	11B20	11B20	11B10
	HQ				ВH													ğ.			
1st	3 rd	1st	2 nd	4 th	НО	2 nd	2 nd	3 rd		1st	3rd		2 nd	4 th				1st	3rd	2 nd	3 rd
Harry M.	Ben	David	Harold L.	Edward L.	Joe	Billy W.	Richard T.	Euel F. Jr	James W.	Richard A.	Simplicio B.	Sammie Jr	Jerry M.	Thomas W. Jr	Dennis H.	Dean S.	Roger D.	William	Carl E.	James F.	Ceasar J.
Brandt	Bulgarin	Cabeceiras	Cammack	Campbell	Canada	Capps	Carey	Carnes	Carter	Carver	Catiggay	Chappell	Chunges	Cole	Colvin	Craig	Crawford	Crews	Croft	Crosswhite	Crudup
SP4	2LT	SP4	SP4	PFC	SP4	SP4	SP4	SGT	SSG	PSG	PSG	PFC	SP4	PFC	PFC	PFC	PV2	2LT	SP4	SP4	PFC

										Γ	Γ						Г				
ACMV	PH		CIB		CIB					SS	BSs, ACMv, CIB		H			CIB			KIA 11-12-66		
	WIA							09/25/66					02/15/67							10/18/66	11/12/66
29-90	29-90	19-70	10-67	04-67	10-67	29-90	11-66	29-90	19-70	29-90	79-80	29-20	04-67	11-66	79-70	19-70	19-70	29-20		29-90	07-67
99-90	99-90	99-20	10-66	99-20	10-66	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-80	99-20	04-66	99-20	99-20	99-70	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-90	07-66
11C10	11B40	76Y20	11B10	11B40	11B10	11B40	11B20	11B20	11B20	11B40	1542	11B40	11C40	11B20	11B20	11B10	11C10	11B20	11B20	11B40	11B20
											ğ										
4 th	3 rd	HQ		2 nd	2 nd			2 nd	3 rd	3 rd	2 nd	4th	4th		HQ		4th	184	2 nd	1 st	3 rd
David F.	Rogers L.	Robert C.	Darrell J.	Luis	Reyes	Alphonse	Larry	Larry	Delbert A	Zoilo T.	David R.	Marvin	Henry, L.	Donald	Peter R, Jr	Wayne E.	John A.	John T. Jr	Nicholas J.	Terrence A.	David N.
Curtis	Curtis	Dalziel	Darner	De La Garza	Delgado	Denson	Dingy	Dixon	Doane	Domingo	Dresia	Dew	Dziekon	Ecufason	Edwards	Englehart	Fanning	Franco	Fulmer	Gaatz	Gaither
PFC	SGT	SP4	PFC	SGT-P	PFC	SSG-P	SP4	SP4	SP4	SSG-P	√1LT	SGT	SGT	SP4	SP4	PFC	PFC	SP4	SP4	SGT	SP4

			PH; Deceased	SS, ACMv, ACMs		CIB			CIB		PH	BS, CIB		ACMs, PH, CIB						ACMs	Co Clerk
			02/15/67	11/12/66			09/17/60				11/12/66		10/18/66	09/25/66							
29-20	29-90	04-67	29-90	29-90	29-60	10-67	04-67	29-90	79-70	03-67	04-67	11-67	79-70	79-70	29-90	29-20	04-67	29-90	29-90	29-90	79-70
99-20	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-60	10-66	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-20	99-60	11-66	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-20
11C10	11B20	11B40	1542	11B40	11B10	11B10	11B10	11B40	1542	11B20	11C20	11B10	11B40	11B20	11C10	11B20	11B10	11B40	11B10	11B20	11C20
			HQ						HQ					2 nd							
4 th	1st	1st	2 nd	2 nd			2 nd		3 rd	1st	₩4		2 nd	1st	4 th	44		1st	3'd	2 nd	4th
Herbert J.	Jose J.	Larry	Everett	William J.	Everett H.	Ronnie D.	Robert	Robert A.	Chuck	Phillip W.	Raymond D.	Tony W.	Houston J.	Thomas L.	Lanny M.	James J.	Cintron	Stanley M.	John L.	Charles	Robert V.
Gannon	Garcia-Roman	Gee	Glick	Grandy	Graul	Gunter	Gutierrez	Haney	Harmon	Harris	Hart	Hartsfield	Hasty	Hedin	Heinrich	Hennessey	Hernandez	Hewitt	Hiatt	Hightower	Hines
PFC	SP4	SGT	2LT	SSG-P	PFC	PFC	PFC	SGT	2LT	SP4	SP4	PFC	SGT	√SP4	SP4	SP4	PFC	SSG-P	PFC	SP4	SP4

RTO			CIB		RTO "Tuck"							FO	KIA 02-15-67; ACMv		CIB	KIA 12-17-66					
	11/12/66					11/12/66													11/12/66		
29-80	04-67	04-67	19-20	29-20	29-20	04-67	04-67	29-90	29-90	04-67	29-60	29-90		29-90	19-10		29-90	29-90	29-90	04-67	04-67
99-80	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-60	99-60	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-20	99-80
11C20	11B20	11B20	1542	11C10	11B40	11B10	11B40	11B10	11B20	11B10	11B40	11C20	11B20	11B20	11C20	11B10	11B20	11B20	11B20	11B20	31C10
			ğ		3rd										#3						
4 th	3 rd	2 nd	1st	44	2 nd	3rd		2 nd	4 th			4th	1st	1st	4 th	2 nd	3rd	3 rd	3rd	1st	ЯH
Harry T. Jr	Robert E.	Donald	Jimmy	Russell L.	Ronald A.	Kenneth W.	Othel	Charles L.	John J.	William E.	Sammy W.	Jerry W.	James L.	Larry E.	Lloyd D.	John R.	George E.	Delbert L.	Hubert A.	Antonio	Napoleon
Hodge	Hollon	Hughes	Johnson	Johnson	Johnson	Jones	Jones	Judkins	Kalin	Knass	Knight	Knox	Kramer	Langenberg	La Valla	Lee	Lego	Lemaster	Linscott	Lo Galbo	Lofton
SP4	SP4	SP4	2LT	PFC	SGT	PFC	SSG	SP4	SP4	PFC	SSG	SP4	SP4	SP4	√SP4	PFC	SP4	SP4	SP4	SP4	PFC

Lombardi	Richard P.	2 nd		11B20	99-20	29-20		
Lopez	Francisco	HQ		71H20	07-66	07-67		
Mac Keigan	Colin J.	3 rd		11B10	07-66	04-67		
Machitka	Wasil	4 th		11B20	07-66	19-70		
Malet	Ronald U.	4 th		11C20	99-20	19-10		CIB; "Ron"
Markase	Frank M.	3 rd	2 nd	11B40	99-90	03-67		CIB; Transfer to HHC
Marshall	Daniel S.	2 nd		11B20	99-90	29-90	02/15/67	BS, PH
Mathews	Lynden	3 rd	2 nd	11B20	1966	10-67	10/07/67	
Mask	Billy V.	2 nd		11B20	07-66	07-67		
Matlack	Edward	3rd		11B10	99-20	04-67	11/12/66	
McDowell	Robert W. Jr.	3rd		11B20	99-20	04-67		
McGivern	Bernard N.			11B10	99-20	04-67		
McKinnie	Onegia	2 _{nd}		11B20	99-20	29-20	11/12/66 02/15/67	
Miles	Robert J.	4th		11C20	99-90	29-90		ACM
Miles	Thomas W.	4 th		11B20	99-80	04-67		
Modlin	Grady S.	3 rd		11B20	99-20	04-67		
Moore	Charles E.	НД		11B20	99-20	04-67		
Moore	Donald			11B10	1966	1967		
Morris	Roy L.			11B10	99-20	19-20		
Mraz	William J.			11B20	99-20	04-67		
Murphy	Robert L.	1st		11B10	99-20	04-67		

						SS					BS, SS				ACM	BS		ACMV		CIB	
					09/17/60		02/68		8									11/12/66		10/20/66	
04-67	11-66	04-67	06-67	19-20	07-67	07-67	19-20	06-67	04-67	08-67	06-67	09-67	06-67	11-66	29-90	04-67	29-80	29-90	29-80	04-67	19-10
99-20	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-20	01-67	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-80	99-90	99-60	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-90	99-20	99-20
11B10	11B10	11B10	11B20	11B10	11B20	1542	1542	11B20	11B40	11B10	11B50	11B10	11B40	11820	31B20	11B40	11B40	11B20	11C10	11B10	11B20
						НО	HQ														
-1 st		1st	2 nd	1st	2 nd	НО	4th	1st	1st	1st	рн		2 nd	2 nd	НД	1st	4 th	2 nd	4 th		TS.
Robert L.	Clarence	Leon Jr	Callan W.	Louis	William F.	Edward	Bob	Conrad L.	John Jr	Odis A.	Francisco C.	Robert	Benjamin	Marco	George A.	John E.	John S.	Roosevelt	James R.	Ermelindo Jr.	Dennis P.
Murphy	Murphy	Nelson	Nevland	Noriega	Norris	Northrop	Nuth	Padilla	Panak	Patterson	Pereda	Perez	Pimentel	Pimpenella	Pippins	Potteiger	Prajzner	President	Prestwood	Puente	Quinn
PFC	PFC	PFC	SP4	PFC	SP4	CPT	11.1	SP4	SSG	PFC	186	PFC	SGT	SP4	SP4	SGT-P	SGT	SP4	PFC	PFC	SP4

	?	Š		
į	a	י		
19	כ	2	0	
C	ì	_		

SSG	Raymond	John J.	1 st		11B40	07-66			KIA 03-15-67
SP4	Reed	James E. Jr			11820	99-80	08-67		
SP4	Reese	Robert A.	4 th		11C20	10-66	10-67		
SP4	Reilly	Michael E.	2 nd		11B20	99-20	29-20	11/11/66	ACMv
PFC	Reynolds	Cleveland	4 th		11C10	07-66	29-20		
SP4	Rice	Gilford S.	4 th		11B20	99-20	04-67		
SP4	Richardson	David R.			11B20		02-67		BS
SGT	Rivera	Manuel H. Jr	4 th		11C40	07-66	29-20		ACMv
PFC	Roberson	Cornelius	НД		36A20	07-66	11-66	11/12/66	
PFC	Roberts	Charles L.	4 th		11C10	07-66	11-66		
PFC	Robinson	Kenneth W.	НО		11B10	99-20	04-67		
SP4	Romanik	Thomas A.	3 rd		11B20	99-20	04-67		
SP4	Roumpf	Danny D.	1st		11B20	07-66	11-66		
SP4	Rowland	Tommy Jr.	3 rd		11B20	99-20	07-67		ACMv
SP4	Rowland	Jerry E.	3 rd		11B20	99-20	04-67		
SGT-P	Sacdalan	Rogelio M.	4 th	#3	11C40	99-90	05-67		ACM "Roger"
PSG-P	Santos	Velazquez I.	1st	HQ	11B40	99-90	06-67		
SP4	Schlott	Roger J.	4 th		11C20	99-20	12-66	11/12/66	ЬН
SGT	Scott	Richard G.	4 th		11B40	99-90	29-90		CIB, BS
SGT	Senquiz-Rodriquez	Jose	4 th		11B40	99-90	04-67		
SP4	Sensenbach	William L.	3 rd		11B20	99-90	29-90		SS
SGT	Shearer	James H.	1st		11B40	99-90	11-66	WIA	BS, PH

	BS		CIB, "Shortime"				Deceased		ACMv		ACMV		ACMv	SS, PH	KIA 9/21 to 09-27-66				CIB	Deceased	Went LRRP in 01-67
		02/15/67											11/12/66	11/12/66							
29-90	11-66	04-67	07-67	06-67	04-67	06-67	06-67	11-66	11-66	29-90	19-20	29-90	07-67	19-70		29-90	04-67	07-67	29-20	07-67	01-67
99-90	99-20	99-20	07-66	99-90	99-20	07-66	07-66	07-66	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	07-66	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20	99-20
11B10	11B20	11C10	11B20	11C10	11B10	11B20	11B20	36K20	11C10	11B10	11B10	11B40	11B20	1542	11C40	11B20	11B20	11B10	11C10	11B10	11B40
														НФ							
3rd	3 rd	4th	2 nd	4 th	4 th	3 rd	1 st	НО	4 th		3 rd	2 nd	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	2 nd	1st	1 st	4 th	1st	2 nd
Stuart L.	Michael G.	John R.	Gene A.	Luwell E.	Jacobes C.	Robert J.	Willman N.	Lafayette	James W.	Phillip	Max	Gary	Dennis P.	Timothy T.	Istvan	Wesley M.	James C.	Mack S.	Stephen D.	James N.	Sherman T.
Shedd	Simm	Sims	Sjoquist	Smallwood	Smith	Smith	Spaulding	Spradley	Stiffler	Strafford	Strnisha	Stubbs	Sullivan	Swan	Szabo	Taylor	Tew	Thompson	Thompson	Thronson	Tilley
PFC	SP4	PFC	√SP4	PFC	PFC	SP4	SP4	SP4-P	PFC	PFC	PFC	SGT	SP4	1LT	SSG	SP4	SP4	PFC	PFC	PFC	SSG

												T									1
		KIA 03-17-67		ACMv	ACM	KIA 11-12-66		ACMv			KIA 02-16-67		CIB			KIA 02-15-67; MOH					
				11/12/66				11/12/66													
04-67	07-67		04-67	04-67	04-67		29-90	29-90	07-67	29-20		12-67	29-20	04-67	04-67		06-67	04-67	06-67	11-66	29-20
99-20	99-20	12-66	99-20	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-90	06-66	07-66	07-66	06-66	1966	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-90	99-20	99-90	99-20	99-20
11B20	76Y10	11B10	11B40	05B10	11B20	71B20	11B40	11B20	11B20	11B40	11B40	11B10	11B10	11B20	11B10	11B10	11B10	11B10	11B20	76K20	11B40
4th	НО	2 nd	4th	3 rd	1 st	2 _{nd}	4th	2 nd	1st		1st			1st		1st	3 rd		3 rd	НО	1st .
Raymond L.	Joseph	Otto D.	Crisanto M.	Santos	Joseph W.	Cecil	George	Theodor	James D.	Joe A.	William D.		Rudolph M. Jr.	Joseph W.	Alexander	Louis E.	Willie J.	Richard D.	Roger D.	Wilbur P.	Gerald L.
Touchton	Troiani	Tucker	Vair	Villareal	Whalen	Walker	Ward	Washington	Watts	Weldon	Wessells	West	Westry	Whalen	Wiggs	Willett	Williams	Williams	Williams	Williams	Wilson
SP4	PFC	PFC	SSG	PFC	SP4	CPL	SGT	SP4	SP4	SSG	SSG	PFC	PFC	SP4	PFC	PFC	PFC	PFC	SP4	PV2	SGT

PFC	PFC Winscott		3rd		11B10 07-66	99-20	29-20	07-67 11/12/66	
1LT	1LT Wise	Franklin F.	4th	HQ	1542	99-20	12-67		
JSP4 Witt	Witt	Dennis M.	2 nd		11B20	10-66	10-67		BSs,BSv,CIB; Transfer to HHC
SP4	Yazzie	Joe L.	1 st		11B20	99-20	04-67		
11.	1LT Zapata	Juan A.	НД	ОХ	1542	09-66	03-67		
SP4	SP4 Zawiski	Albert P.	2 nd		11B20	99-90	04-67		11/12/66 PH; RW LZ "AI"

APPENDIX D CASUALTY RECORDS

- Personal -

Last Name: Card First Name: Wayne Middle Name: Norman

Home of Record (official): Whittier

State (official): California

Date of Birth: Monday, 7 July 1947

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

- Military -

Branch: Army Rank: Corporal

Serial Number: 56418328 Component: Selective Service

Posthumous Promotion As Indicated

Pay Grade: E-3

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B10 (Infantryman)

Awards: Unknown Unit: Bravo Company

— Action —

Start of Tour: Tuesday, 27 September 1966 Date of Casualty: Thursday, 16 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 19

Casualty Type: (A2) Hostile, Died of Wounds from 15 February

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 040

- Personal -

Last Name: Carkin First Name: Harvey Middle Name: McKee

Home of Record (official): Vienna

State (official): Virginia

Date of Birth: Saturday, 30 September 1944

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Married

- Military -

Branch: Army Rank: Sergeant

Serial Number: 13800445 Component: Regular

Pay Grade: E-5

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B40 (Infantryman)

Awards: Unknown Unit: Bravo Company

- Action -

Start of Tour: Monday, 12 December 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 22

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 033

- Personal -

Last Name: Carver First Name: Richard Middle Name: Alan

Home of Record (official): Escondido

State (official): California

Date of Birth: Tuesday, 7 June 1927

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Married

— Military —

Branch: Army

Rank: Platoon Sergeant Serial Number: 19256424 Component: Regular

Pay Grade: E-7

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B40 (Infantryman) Awards: Army Commendation Medal for Valor (Posthumously) Unit: Charlie Company, 1st Platoon, Headquarters Section

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 39

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N; YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 033



- Personal -

Last Name: Daniels First Name: Johnie Middle Name: Nathaniel

Home of Record (official): Redfield

State (official): Arkansas

Date of Birth: Wednesday, 16 January 1946

Sex: Male Race: Negro

Marital Status: Single



Branch: Army

Rank: Specialist Fourth Class Serial Number: 54370074 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-4

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B20 (Infantryman) Awards: Combat Infantry Badge, Bronze Star (Posthumously)

Unit: Bravo Company, 3rd Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Wednesday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 21

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 032



- Personal -

Last Name: Gehler First Name: Ronald Middle Name: Charles

Home of Record (official): Sioux Falls

State (official): South Dakota

Date of Birth: Sunday, 12 September 1943

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Specialist Fourth Class Serial Number: 28276022 Component: Regular

Pay Grade: E-4

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B20 (Infantryman)

Awards: Combat Infantry Badge

Unit: Bravo Company

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 23

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 032

- Personal -

Last Name: Kramer First Name: James Middle Name: Lee

Home of Record (official): Las Vegas

State (official): Nevada

Date of Birth: Saturday, 3 August 1946

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Specialist Fourth Class Serial Number: 56397612 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-4

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B20 (Infantryman)
Awards: Army Commendation Medal for Valor (Posthumously)

Unit: Charlie Company, 1st Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 20

Casualty type: (A3) Hostile, Died While Missing

Reason: Multiple Fragmentation Wounds (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N; YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 033



- Personal -

Last Name: Manners First Name: Van Dyke Middle Name; William

Home of Record (official): Ringoes

State (official): New Jersey

Date of Birth: Saturday, 10 November 1945

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Private First Class Serial Number: 51593755 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-3

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B10 (Infantryman)

Awards: Combat Infantry Badge

Unit: Headquarters & Headquarters Company

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 21

Casualty Type: (A2) Hostile, Died of Wounds

Reason: Other Explosive Device (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 034

- Personal -

Last Name: Raymond First name: John Middle Name: James

Home of Record (official): Taunton State (official): Massachusetts

Date of Birth: Saturday, 1 December 1917

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian

Marital Status: Married

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Staff Sergeant Serial Number: 31035459 Component: Regular

Pay Grade: E-6

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B40 (Infantryman)

Awards: Unknown

Unit: Charlie Company, 1st Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 49

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N; YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 035

- Personal -

Last Name: Reilly First Name: Michael Middle Name: Patrick

Home of Record (official): La Grange

State (official): Illinois

Date of Birth: Sunday, 30 December 1945

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

— Military —

Branch: Army

Rank: Specialist Fourth Class Serial Number: 55860647 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-4

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B20 (Infantryman)

Awards: Silver Star (Posthumously) Unit: Bravo Company, 3rd Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 21

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston Location: LZ 501N, YA 602547

The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 035



- Personal -

Last Name: Speak First Name: Eric Middle Name: B

Home of Record (official): Costa Mesa

State (official): California

Date of Birth: Friday, 22 August 1947

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

— Military —

Branch: Army Rank: Corporal

Serial Number: 19878835 Component: Regular

Posthumous Promotion as Indicated

Pay grade: E-3

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11C10 (Indirect Fire Infantryman)

Awards: Unknown

Unit: Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Mortar Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 15 September 1966 Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 19

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 595542 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 036

- Personal -

Last Name: Volner First Name: John Middle Name: Delane

Home of Record (official): Lexington

State (official): Tennessee

Date of Birth: Saturday, 21 September 1946

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Private First Class Serial Number: 53429994 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-3

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B10 (Infantryman)

Awards: Distinguished Service Cross (Posthumously)

Unit: Bravo Company

- Action -

Start of Tour: Monday, 19 September 1966 Date of Casualty: Friday, 17 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 20

Casualty Type: (A1) Hostile, Died

Reason: Misadventure (friendly fire) (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N, YA 594543 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 055



- Personal -

Last Name: Wessells First Name: William Middle Name: David

Home of Record (official): Accomac

State (official): Virginia

Date of Birth: Sunday, 15 October 1944

Sex: Male Race: Negro

Marital Status: Married

- Military -

Branch: Army

Rank: Staff Sergeant Serial Number: 13784622 Component: Regular

Pay Grade: E-6

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B40 (Infantryman)

Awards: Unknown Unit: Charlie Company

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Thursday, 16 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 22

Casualty Type: (A2) Hostile, Died of Wounds Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N; YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 053

- Personal -

Last Name: Willett First Name: Louis Middle Name: Edward

Home of Record (official): Richmond Hill

State (official): New York

Date of Birth: Tuesday, 19 June 1945

Sex: Male

Race: Caucasian Marital Status: Single

— Military —

Branch: Army

Rank: Private First Class Serial Number: 51580250 Component: Selective Service

Pay Grade: E-3

Military Occupational Specialty Code: 11B10

(Infantryman)

Awards: Medal of Honor (Posthumously) Unit: Charlie Company, 1st Platoon

- Action -

Start of Tour: Thursday, 21 July 1966

Date of Casualty: Wednesday, 15 February 1967

Age At Time of Loss: 21

Casualty Type: (A3) Hostile, Died While Missing Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire (Ground Casualty)

Country: South Vietnam

Province: Kontum

Operation: Sam Houston

Location: LZ 501N; YA 602547 The Wall: Panel 15E - Row 037





Medal of Honor

Louis E. Willett.

Rank and Organization: Private First Class, U.S. Army, Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division.

Place and Date: Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam, 15 February 1967.

Entered Service: Brooklyn, New York

Born: 19 June 1945, Brooklyn, New York

Citation

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Private First Class Willett distinguished himself while serving as a rifleman in Company C, during combat operations. His squad was conducting a security sweep when it made contact with a large enemy force. The squad was immediately engaged with a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and pinned to the ground. Despite the deadly fusillade, Private First Class Willett rose to his feet firing rapid bursts from his weapon and moved to a position from which he placed highly effective fire on the enemy. His action allowed the remainder of his squad to begin to withdraw from the superior enemy force toward the company perimeter. Private First Class Willett covered the squad's withdrawal, but his position drew heavy enemy machine gun fire, and he received multiple wounds enabling the enemy again to pin down the remainder of the squad. Private First Class Willett struggled to an upright position, and, disregarding his painful wounds, he again engaged the enemy with his rifle to allow his squad to continue its movement and to evacuate several of his comrades who were by now wounded. Moving from position to position, he engaged the enemy at close range until he was mortally wounded. By his unselfish acts of bravery, Private First Class Willett insured the withdrawal of his comrades to the company position, saving their lives at the cost of his life. Private First Class Willett's valorous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army and reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his country.

APPENDIX E AWARDS

501N KNOWN AWARDS

A review of published orders, newspaper articles, books, and internet web sites has identified 59 awards that are a direct result of this battle. This accounting includes the 13 KIAs and 20 of the 32 WIAs. It is assumed that the remaining unknown 12 WIAs also received at least a Purple Heart. The following is a break-down of the 59 known awards by company.

Headquarters & Headquarters Company (5)

Bronze Star for Valor

SP4 Peter Raineri

SP4 Raymond Beech

Army Commendation Medal

CPT Melvin Deutsch

Unknown Award

PFC Van Dyke Manners (posthumously)

CPL Eric Speak (posthumously)

Bravo Company (32)

Silver Star

1SG Jimmie Jones

SSG Fred Case

PFC Byron Thompson

SP4 Michael Reilly (posthumously)

Distinguished Service Cross

PFC John Volner (posthumously)

Bronze Star for Valor

SSG James Hafford

SSG Carlos Rivera-Luna

SGT Dwight Hansen

SGT James Ingram

SP4 Bruce Pealer

OF 4 Didoc I calci

SP4 Melvin Faber

SP4 Doug Philipps

PFC Travis Lamkin

PFC Juan Garcia

PFC Ronald Norton

SP4 Johnie Daniels (posthumously)

Purple Heart

CPT Ed Scherer

LT Leonard Davis

SSG James Hafford

SSG Tingler

SGT Lonnie Barnes

SGT Johnny West

SP4 Richard Brady

SP4 Albert Bryla

SP4 Mike Datish

PFC Herbert Armstrong

PFC Alex Boyd

PFC Donald Campbell

PFC Sherman Swim

Unknown Awards

CPL Wayne Card (posthumously)

SGT Harvey Carkin (posthumously)

SP4 Ronald Gehler (posthumously)

Charlie Company (22)

Medal of Honor

PFC Louis Willett (posthumously)

Silver Star

CPT Edward Northrop

Bronze Star for Valor

2LT William Crews

SGT John Potteiger

SP4 Michael Simm

SP4 David Richardson

PFC Travis Hartsfield

PFC Dennis Witt

PFC Daniel Marshall

Army Commendation Medal

SFC Richard Carver (posthumously)

SP4 James Kramer (posthumously)

SP4 Joseph Wahlen

SP4 George Pippins

Purple Heart

LT Ben Bulgarin

LT William Crews

LT Everett Glick

SGT Henry Dziekon

SP4 Onegia McKinnie

PFC Daniel Marshall

PFC John Sims (sp?)

Unknown Awards

SSG John Raymond (posthumously)

SSG William Wessells (posthumously)

General Orders

No. 52

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, D.C., 30 September 1968

AWARD OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR

By direction of the President, under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved 12 July 1862 (amended by act of 3 March 1863, act of 9 July 1918 and act of 25 July 1963), the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty is awarded posthumously by the Department of the Army in the name of Congress to:

Private First Class Louis E. Willett, US51580250, United States Army, who distinguished himself on 15 February 1967 while serving as a rifleman in Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division during combat operations in Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam. His squad was conducting a security sweep when it made contact with a large enemy force. The squad was immediately engaged with a heavy volume of automatic fire and pinned to the ground. Despite the deadly fusillade, Private Willett rose to his feet firing rapid bursts from his own weapon and moved to a position from which he placed highly effective fire on the enemy. His action allowed the remainder of his squad to begin to withdraw from the superior enemy force toward the company's perimeter. Private Willett covered the squad's withdrawal, but his position drew heavy enemy machine gun fire and he received multiple wounds enabling the enemy again to pin down the remainder of the squad. Private Willett struggled to an upright position, and, disregarding his painful wounds, he again engaged the enemy with his rifle to allow his squad to continue its movement and to evacuate several of his comrades who were by now wounded. Moving from position to position, he engaged the enemy at close range until he was mortally wounded. By his unselfish acts of bravery, Private Willett insured the withdrawal of his comrades to the company position, saving their lives at the cost of his own. Private Willett's valorous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army and reflect great credit upon himself and the armed forces of this country.

UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM APO San Francisco 96262

GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 1730 15 April 1967

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced posthumously:

VOLNER, JOHN DELANE, PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E3, United States Army Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96262

Awarded: Distinguished Service Cross Date action: 15 - 17 February 1967

Theater: Republic of Vietnam

Reason: For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam, while serving with Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. Private First Class Volner distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions during the period 15 February 1967 to 17 February 1967 while serving as radio-telephone operator with an infantry unit during combat operations in Kontum Province. After learning that lead elements of his force were pinned down by intense cross fire from hostile emplacements, Private Volner unhesitatingly volunteered to move to their position to keep the company commander informed of developments in that sector. When these men were able to withdraw to higher ground, Private Volner received notice that another platoon was about to be overrun. Unflinching under the hail of fire that raked the area, he threaded his way into the pinned platoon. With a clearheaded account of enemy movements, he enabled the company commander to effectively maneuver his forces. On the evening of 17 February, Private Volner detected movement outside his unit's perimeter. His alertness prompted the company commander to call for artillery fire. While he was radioing information to the command post, Private Volner heard artillery rounds coming in on his own position. Heedless of his own safety, he grabbed a comrade moments before a round struck, pulled him to the bottom of the foxhole, and threw his own body on top of him to shield him from the blast. Private Volner was fatally wounded in this selfless and courageous sacrifice to save his comrade. Private First Class Volner's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty, at the cost of his life, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

Authority: by direction of the President under provisions of Executive Order

11046, 24 August 1962.

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96262

GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 529 2 April 1967

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced:

NORTHROP, EDWARD D JR, CAPTAIN, INFANTRY, United States Army Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96262

Awarded: Silver Star

Date Action: 15 February 1967 Theater: Republic of Vietnam

Reason:

For gallantry in action: Captain Northrop distinguished himself on 15 February 1967, in the Republic of Vietnam. On this date, Captain Northrop, the commanding officer of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, was in charge of a small force assigned to secure a landing zone for future occupancy by the 1st A squad, making a routine inspection of the surrounding forest, discovered a force of approximately three North Vietnamese companies holding a well fortified position. Denied the element of surprise, the enemy attacked in force, utilizing rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small arms. Acting swiftly and surely. Captain Northrop immediately deployed his forces, to take maximum advantage of available fire power, and launched an aggressive counterattack. He repeatedly crossed open ground, in the face of withering enemy fire, in order to gain firsthand knowledge of casualties, available ammunition, and required reinforcements. Captain Northrop's courage and indomitable leadership inspired his men and instilled in them the spirit which spurred them to successfully repel the brutal enemy onslaught. His unimpeachable valor in close combat with a numerically superior force of enemy troops is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

Authority: By the direction of the President under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 9 July 1918.

FOR THE COMMANDER

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96262

GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 4474 30 March 1967

AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL FOR HEROISM

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced:

WITT, DENNIS M, PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3, United States Army Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96262

Awarded: Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device

Date Action: 15 February 1967 Theater: Republic of Vietnam

Reason:

For distinguishing himself by heroism in connection with ground operations against a hostile force on 15 February 1967, in the Republic of Vietnam. Private First Class Witt was serving as radio-telephone operator for the company commander of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. The company's mission was to secure a landing zone for the battalion and other elements. Shortly after dawn, the landing zone was brought under intense fire by North Vietnamese forces utilizing rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, machine guns, automatic weapons, and mortars. Private First Class Witt heard cries of pain from inside a perimeter bunker. With complete disregard for his own safety, he ran from the command post to the bunker and administered first aid to three wounded men. Then, noticing that he was the only remaining able-bodied man in the bunker, he manned the machine gun mounted there and brought effective fire on the advancing enemy. Having spotted a number of enemy positions. Private First Class Witt ran under fire to the company commander to report what he had seen. He later ran back to the machine gun until replaced and returned to the command post to resume his duties as radiotelephone operator. This outstanding display of aggressiveness, courage and devotion to duty is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

Authority: By the direction of the President under the provisions of Executive Order 11046, 24 August 1962.

FOR THE COMMANDER

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96262

GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 11046 30 March 1968

AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL FOR HEROISM

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced:

PHILIPPS, DOUGLAS, SPECIALIST FOURTH CLASS E-4, United States Army Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96262

Awarded: Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device

Date Action: 15 February 1967 Theater: Republic of Vietnam

Reason:

For distinguishing himself by heroism in connection with military operations in the Republic of Vietnam. On 15 February 1967, at LZ 501N, Specialist Four Philipps distinguished himself by heroic action against a hostile force. When Specialist Four Philipps arrived at LZ 501N at approximately 1530 hours, enemy contact was already established. Due to heavy enemy firing, the boxes of mortar ammunition and hand grenades, which had arrived earlier, were burning. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety; he moved into the burning area to retrieve the mortars and equipment that was beginning to burn. Specialist Four Philipps, along with the other men of his squad, worked feverishly among the exploding hand grenades in order to save the mortars and ammunition. Specialist Four Philipps repeatedly exposed himself to enemy hostile fire.

Specialist Four Philipps again distinguished himself when he placed his mortar into action under heavy enemy sniper fire. Specialist Four Philipps' mortar, the one which he was gunning, brought mortar rounds within ten feet of the members of the 3rd Platoon, who were pinned down by hostile fire. Firing a total of 250 rounds for effect, he allowed a major portion of B Company to safely withdraw, and eliminated the NVA gunners. This outstanding devotion to duty and personal bravery are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

Authority: By the direction of the President under the provisions of Executive Order 11046, 24 August 1962.

FOR THE COMMANDER

APPENDIX F GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

After Action Report	A written summary of actions after an event An assault conducted with air mobile
7111 71000011	resources
AK-47	A 7.62mm assault rifle used by the NVA
AO	Area of Operation
Arc Light	B-52 bombing mission
Base Area 702	An NVA staging area in Cambodia
B3 Front	The NVA headquarters for central South Vietnam
BENT	A period of time known as before evening nautical twilight, 30 minutes after sunset
C4	A white-colored plastic explosive
Central Highlands	A mountainous region in middle south Vietnam
Chinook	CH-41 troop/cargo transport helicopter
Claymore	An M-18 antipersonnel mine
Combined Arms Team	A team composed of Infantry, Artillery and air resources
Covering Screen	A type of ground mission performed to provide security with a small force
Daily Staff Journal	A log or registry used to record activities and events
Daily SitRep	Daily Situation Report
DefCon	Defensive Concentrations of artillery fire
EMNT	A period of time known as early morning nautical twilight, 30 minutes before sunrise
FAC	Forward Air Controller
Fire Support Base	A location where indirect fire resources are consolidated for massed fire
FO	Indirect fire forward observer
FRAG Order	An abbreviated operations order
Grid Square	A 1000 meter square on a map
Head-count	
	on the move
II Corp	A tactical region in South Vietnam designated by the Military Assistance Command of Vietnam
Kilometer	1000 meters or 5/8 of a mile
Landing Pad	a specific point within a designated area
	for helicopters to land at or on

Landing Zone	An area designated for use as a helicopter landing area
LiftListening Post	그렇게 지하실하다면 되었다. 나는 그렇게 하는 것 같은 사람들이 얼마를 내려가 되었다면 다른 사람들이 되었다.
Movement To Contact	darkness or limited visibility to provide early warning A deliberate move to make contact with another force, usually the enemy
NVA Observation Post	North Vietnamese Army A three-man team placed outside the perimeter during daylight to observe to provide early warning
Old Man Operation Sam Houston OPORD Pills Plei Djereng	Slang title for the commander officer A 4 th Division field operation A specific operation order Anti-malaria pills taken every morning A prominent South Vietnamese village in the 2 nd Brigade's area of operation
Plei Trap Area	A geographical area near the Cambodian border in Kontum Province
ProvinceReconnaissance and Surveillance Line	A state in Vietnam An arbitrary control line marked on a map
Recon Platoon	A platoon designed to conduct reconnaissance work
RPG Saddle Up	A B-40 rocket propelled grenade To put one's personal field equipment on and prepare to move out or depart
Screening Mission	A field maneuver designed to be used by a small unit to cover a large area for the purpose of detecting enemy infiltration
Search-and-Destroy Mission	A field mission designed to trap an enemy force and destroy it
Short Round	An indirect fire round (mortar or artillery) that lands short of its intended target
SOI	Communications Standard Operating Instructions
Sortie	A word used to describe one or more aircraft who's mission it was to return one or more times for the same task
SP	Start Point and/or the act of departure

Stand-down	A period of time during which a unit is taken out of combat and allowed to rest and refit
Sweep	A type of patrol conducted to determine if a specified area is free of enemy forces
Three Tango	A code name for the location of 2 nd Brigade forward headquarters. Also GI slang for correct name, "3T"

APPENDIX G INDEX

INDEX

A

Ackerman, Edwin, Lieutenant - A1, C17
Adamson, Colonel - 42
Armstrong, Herbert, Private First Class - 53, C17, E2

B

Barnes, Lonnie, Sergeant - 53, C17, E2
Beech, Raymond, Specialist Fourth Class - E1
Beilfuss, Ron, Specialist Fourth Class - 34-35, 38, C17
Bennett, Douglas, Captain - A1, C1
Bigelow, James, Captain - A1, C25
Boyd, Alex, Private First Class - 42, 53, C17, E2
Brady, Rick, Specialist Fourth Class - 51, C18, E2
Bryla, Albert, Private First Class - E2
Bulgarin, Ben, Lieutenant - 4, 54, A1, C26, E2

C

Campbell, Donald, Specialist Fourth Class - E2
Card, Wayne, Private First Class - 38, 44, 53, C18, D1, E2
Carkin, Harvey, Sergeant - 38, 42, 44, 53, D2, E2
Carver, Richard, Sergeant First Class - 25, 54, C26, D3, E2
Case, Fred, Staff Sergeant - 31, 34, 51, 54, C18, E1
Cider 26 - 20-21, 23, 39
Clayton, Thudus, Sergeant - 29, C18
Collins, Major General - 48
Conboy, Ken - 2
Crews, Bill, Lieutenant - 4, 54, A1, C26, E2

D

Daniels, Jim, Specialist Fourth Class - 6, 12, 14, 16, 22, 32, 45 Daniels, Johnie, Specialist Fourth Class - 53-54, C19, D4, E1 Datish, Mike, Specialist Fourth Class - 53, C19, E2 Davis, Leonard, Lieutenant - 53, A1, C19, E1 Deutsch, Melvin, Captain - A1, C2, E1 Dew, Marvin, Specialist Fourth Class - 29, C19 Domingo, Zoilo, Staff Sergeant - 15, 25, C27 Dresia, David, Lieutenant - 4, 54, A1, C 27 Duquemin, Lieutenant Colonel - 25-26 Dziekon, Henry, Sergeant - 54, C27, E2

F

Faber, Melvin, Sergeant - 26-27, 31, 34, 36-38, 50, C19, E1 Fontenout, Gene, Captain - 20 Frank, Martin, Private First Class - 29, C20

G

Garcia, Juan, Private First Class - 54, C20, E1 Gehler, Ronald, Specialist Fourth Class - 53, C20, D5, E2 Glick, Everett, Lieutenant - 4, 25, 54, A1, C28, E2 Green, Joe, Captain - 54

H

Hafford, James, Sergeant - 53, C20, E1
Hansen, Dwight, Sergeant - 46, 54, C20, E1
Hartsfield, Travis, Private First Class - E2
Hedin, Thomas, Private First Class - 8, 11, 15, 21, 25, 28, 33, 46, C28

1

Ingram, James, Specialist Fourth Class - 34-35, 54, C20, E1

J

Jaffy, Private First Class - 34, C20 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President - 54 Johnson, Ronald, Private First Class - 29, C21 Jones, Jimmy, First Sergeant - 51, 54, C21, E1

K

Kaneko, Julio, Staff Sergeant - 53 Keith, John, Private First Class - 51 Kichman, Bill, Private First Class - 34, C21 Kohler, Harrison, Specialist Fifth Class - 29, 38, 42, 51, C4 Kramer, James, Specialist Fourth Class - 21, 54, C29, D6, E2

L

Lackey, Frank, Specialist Fourth Class - 34, C21 Lamkin, Travis, Private First Class - 54, C21, E1 Laux, James, Lieutenant - A1 LaValla, Lloyd, Specialist Fourth Class - 4, 13, C29 Lay, James R., Lieutenant Colonel - 7, A1, C5

M

Manners, Van Dyke, Private First Class - E1
McKinnie, Onegia, Specialist Fourth Class - 54, C30, E2
McMillion, Jim, Private First Class - 30, 34-36, 38-39, 42, 44, 46, 48, 51, C22
Manners, Van Dyke, Private First Class - 53, D7
Marshall, Daniel, Private First Class - 19-21, 54, C30, E2
Montgomery, Owen, Sergeant - 44, C22
Moody, Edward, Private First Class - 36-37, C22

N

Nam Satnay River - 3, 4, 9 Neal, Barney, Major - A1 Northrop, Edward, Captain - ix, 4-5, 7-11, 15, 19-21, 23, 28-29, 37, 39-40, 42, 46, 48, 52-54, A1, C5, C31, E2, E5 Norton, Ronald, Private First Class - 54, E1

0

Operation Sam Houston - 3, 53

P

Panak, John, Sergeant - 15, 25, 46, C31
Pealer, Bruce, Specialist Fourth Class - 54, C22, E1
Pearson, Robert, Lieutenant - A1, C22
Pereda, Francisco, First Sergeant - Dedication, 4, 9, 25, 39, 48, C31
Philipps, Douglas, Private First Class - 30, 34-35, 38, 54, C22, E1
Pippins, George, Specialist Fourth Class - E2
Potteiger, John, Sergeant - E2

Q

Quann, Brenden, Captain - A1, C15 Quiroz, Rene, Private First Class - 53, C6

R

Raineri, Peter, Specialist Fourth Class - E1 Ray, Rodney, Sergeant - 28, C6

Raymond, John, Staff Sergeant - 23, 54, C31, D8, E2
Reilly, Michael, Specialist Fourth Class - 53-54, C23, D9, E1
Richardson, David, Specialist Fourth Class - E2
Rivera-Luna, Carlos, Staff Sergeant - 54, C23, E1

S

Salavec, Jerome (Jerry), Specialist - 34, 41, C23
Scherer, Edward, Captain - ix, 23, 28-29, 31, 33, 37-38, 51, A1, C6, E1
Sims, John, Private First Class - E2
Se San River - 3, 8
Seip, Roger - 44
Shaver, Clifford, Staff Sergeant - 29, 34, 36, 51, A1, C23
Sims, John, Private First Class - 54, C32
Smith, Barry, Lieutenant - 4, 21
Speak, Eric, Private First Class - 53, D10, E1
Swan, Timothy, Lieutenant - 4, 13, 15, 17, 23, 54, A1, C33
Swim, Shermin, Private First Class - 53, C24, E2
Sylvester, Edwin, Lieutenant - A1

T

Taggs, Robert, Captain - A1
Thompson, Byron, Private First Class - 54, C24, E1
Thronson, Jim, Private First Class - 11, 33, C33
Tingler, Harry, Staff Sergeant - 51, E2

V

Volner, John, Private First Class - 48, 51, 53, C24, D11, E1, E4

W

Wahlen, Joseph, Specialist Fourth Class - E2
Warrior LZ - 9
Watson, Kevin, Private First Class - 29-30, 34, 38, 41, C24
Wessels, William, Staff Sergeant - 23, 54, C34, D12, E2
West, Johnny, Sergeant - 53, C24, E2
White, Jerry, Captain - 41, A1
Wilcox, George, Lieutenant Colonel - 7, 23, A1
Willett, Louis, Private First Class - 15, 19-21, 42, 54, C34, D13-14, E2, E3
Witt, Dennis, Specialist Fourth Class - 5, 9-11, 17-21, 23-25, 28, 42-43, 46-47, 49, C34, E2, E6

APPENDIX H BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- After Action Report
 Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (15 February 1967), 6 April 1967.
- Annual Historical Supplement Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 28 February 1968.
- Daily Staff Journal Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 15 February 1967.
- Dresia, David

 Medal of Honor Citation for Louis Willett, 15 February 1967.
- Faber, Melvin
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2006.
- Hedin, Thomas
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2006, 2007.
- Kohler, Harrison Unpublished Manuscript, 2001.
- LaValla, Lloyd Unpublished Manuscript, 2001.
- McMillion, James
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2002, 2006.
- Moody, Edward
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2006.
- Northrop, Edward Unpublished Manuscript, 2003, 2006, 2007.
- Philipps, Doug Unpublished Manuscript, 2006.
- Quiroz, Rene Unpublished Manuscript, 2001.

- Ray, Rodney
 Unpublished Manuscript, 1967.
- Salavec, Jerome Unpublished Manuscript, 2001
- Scherer, Edward V.
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2006.
- Schneider, George J.

 Annual Historical Supplement, Calendar Year 1967. HQ, 1/12 Infantry, 1968.
- Seip, Roger Unpublished Manuscript, History, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 1969.
- Shaver, Clifford
 Unpublished Manuscript, 2001.
- Stars & Stripes
 18 February 1967, 19 February 1967, and 14 April 1967.
- Swan, Timothy Unpublished Manuscript, 2007.
- Unknown Author Summary of Operations, Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Div. 1967.
- USGS Topographic Maps
 Map Sheet L7014-6437II, 1970; Map Sheet L7014-6536IV, 1970.
- Watson, Kevin Unpublished Manuscript, May 2006.
- Witt, Dennis Unpublished Manuscript, 2005, 2006, 2007.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As with any major undertaking, I could not have compiled and written this report without the contributions of many people:

- ★ First, all of those old soldiers who shared their memories and who are quoted in this battle report, some many times over;
- ★ Second, Ed Northrop (we nagged and goaded each other to get this done);
- ★ Third, Dennis Witt, Melvin Faber, and Ed Northrop, who contributed their photographs;
- ★ Jim Daniels, for his excellent maps;
- ★ and finally, my wife, Mary Boeke Hill, without whose "red pen" this document would never have been finished.

Roger A. Hill April 8, 2007

